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INTRODUCTION 
For the past thirty years, the standard outlined by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington1 has governed the question of adequacy of counsel in criminal trials. 
There, in a Sixth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that simply assigning a 
lawyer to a defendant is not per se constitutionally adequate, and that the lawyer must provide 
“effective   assistance   of   counsel”—effectiveness being defined, pallidly, as requiring only that 
counsel’s   efforts   be   “reasonable”   under   the   circumstances.2 The benchmark for judging an 
                                                                
*  Heather Cucolo is Adjunct Professor at New York Law School. Michael L. Perlin is Professor of Law, 
Emeritus, at New York Law School and Director of the Justice Action Center’s   International   Mental   Disability   Law  
Reform Project. Portions of this Article were presented at the American Society of Criminology annual meeting in 
November 2013, and at a faculty workshop at New York Law School in January 2014. The authors wish to thank 
Katherine Davies and Paul Metcalf for their excellent research assistance.  
1  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2  Id. at 686. The Court further explained that “[a]  court  must  indulge  a  strong  presumption  that  counsel’s  
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
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ineffectiveness  claim  is  simply  “whether  counsel’s  conduct  so  undermined  the  proper  function  of  
the adversarial process that the trial  court  cannot  be  relied  on  as  having  produced  a  just  result.”3 
Although the Court subsequently extended the Strickland standard to apply in cases 
involving plea bargaining,4 plea offers,5 sentencing,6 and the appellate stages of a case7 (as well as 
to the mitigation stage of death penalty cases),8 it has fallen far short of ensuring that counsel is 
truly adequate9: that she investigate the case, provide the defendant with all the information 
necessary for the defendant to make informed choices, and mount a vigorous defense at trial.10 
“There  is  little  evidence  disputing  Strickland’s  failure  to  ensure  adequate  assistance  of  counsel  for  
capital defendants.11 
Examples of cases in which counsel fell clearly short of the mark, yet which were 
affirmed on appeal—in which Strickland arguments were rejected—are, in some circumstances, 
jaw-dropping.   In   one   such   case,   counsel   was   found   to   be   effective   even   though   he   “failed   to  
introduce ballistics evidence to show that the gun taken from [the defendant] when he was 
arrested  was  not   the  murder  weapon.”12 In another case, an attorney was found constitutionally 
adequate to provide representation to a death-eligible defendant notwithstanding the fact that he 
had been admitted to the bar for only six months and had never tried a jury case.13 Another lawyer 
was found constitutionally adequate even when, during the middle of the trial, he appeared in 
court intoxicated and spent a night in jail.14 
                                                                
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action  ‘might  be  considered  sound  trial  strategy.’”  Id. at 689. 
3  Id. at 686. One of the authors of this article (MLP) critiques the Strickland standard extensively in 
MENTAL DISABILITY & THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES 129-34 (2013). 
4  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012). 
5  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-10 (2012). On   why   these   cases   augur   a   “seismic   shift”   in  
Strickland jurisprudence, see Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1161, 1163 (2012). 
6  Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001). 
7  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 475 (2000). 
8  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-38 (2003). 
9  See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069 (2009) 
(analyzing   the  “ineffective  assistance”   jurisprudence). For a novel analysis, arguing that indigent reform would best be 
served by an equal protection analysis rather than a Sixth Amendment analysis, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming 
Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197 (2013). 
10  On the question of whether Strickland is  the  appropriate  standard  in  cases  involving  a  defendant’s  right  to  
testify, see Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Why Strickland is the Wrong Test for Violations of the Right to Testify, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95, 106-123 (2013). 
11  See Michael  L.  Perlin,  “The  Executioner’s  Face  Is  Always  Well-Hidden”:  The  Role  of  Counsel  and  the 
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1996). 
12  Graham v. Collins, 829 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D. Tex. 1993), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Graham 
v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 1996). 
13  See Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-92 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 507 U.S. 1026 (1993), aff’d  on  
remand, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant did  not  “demonstrate[]  that  his  counsel’s  representation  
during  the  trial  was  ineffective”). 
14  Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 377-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that while counsel was found 
drunk  during  trial  and  spent  an  evening  in  jail,  “there  [was]  no  evidence  [that  such  actions]  interfered,  in  any  manner,  with 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/2
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There is also a significant array of post-Strickland cases involving defendants with 
potentially viable insanity or incompetency claims,15 and it is clear from a reading of these cases 
and others like them16—cases involving mental status issues outside the ken of most lawyers17—
that counsel in these cases all too often are little more than what Judge David Bazelon 
characterized  some  forty  years  ago  as  “walking  violations  of   the  Sixth  Amendment.”18 There is 
little evidence to contradict the conclusion of the late Welsh White—a former University of 
Pittsburgh law professor and leading authority on the death penalty—that   “[l]ower   courts’  
application of Strickland has  produced  appalling  results.”19 
When Strickland was decided, the Court had before it a felony case, involving a death 
penalty conviction in multiple homicides.20 And certainly, there is nothing more final than a death 
sentence.  The  Court  has  said  many  times  that  “death  is different”21 as a reflection of this and of 
                                                                
the conduct of the defense or prevented counsel from performing any act in reference to the defense that he desired to 
perform”). 
15  See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451, 454, 463 (2009); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121-
22 (2009); see generally Michael L. Perlin & Valerie R. McClain, “Where  Souls  Are  Forgotten”:  Cultural  Competencies,  
Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 257, 261 (2009) (commenting on 
the  “ineffectiveness  of  counsel  in  cases  involving  defendants  with  potentially  viable  insanity  or  incompetency  claims”). 
16  See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL & CRIMINAL § 2B-11.3, at 267-71 (2d ed. 
1998). 
17  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994) (unpacking 
the roots and myths of mental illness and the insanity defense). 
18  David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973). On how 
Strickland is  the  “holy  grail”  of  ineffective  counsel,  see  Patrick  C. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: The Obligation of the 
Courts to Enforce the Right to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 163, 214-15 (2012) (claiming that the benchmark 
in  Strickland  “actually  more  resembles  [a]  farce-and-mockery-of-justice standard”). 
19  Welsh S. White, Capital   Punishment’s   Future, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (1993) (reviewing 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991)). For other scholarly analyses coming to similar 
conclusions, see Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, Counterproductive and 
Corrupting, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1078-84 (1996) (exploring examples of deficient representation in death 
penalty cases); Christine M. Wiseman, Representing the Condemned: A Critique of Capital Punishment, 79 MARQ. L. 
REV. 731, 742-44   (1996)   (stating   that   “[t]he   stories   of   ineffective   assistance   in   capital   cases   are   legion”);;  Meredith   J.  
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 18-
20  (2002)  (arguing  that  “a  criminally  accused’s  right  to  the  effective  assistance  of  counsel  does  not  have  much  substance  
to  it  at  all”).  On  the  question  of  the  right  to  litigate  Strickland claims, see Ty Alper, Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 872-73 (2013) (exploring when an individual can present a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of the Strickland standard). 
20  466 U.S. at 671-72  (reviewing  the  facts  and  stating  that  “[d]uring  a  10-day period in September 1976, 
respondent planned and committed three groups of crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, torture, 
kidnaping,   severe   assaults,   attempted  murders,   attempted   extortion,   and   theft”).   Strickland was argued in tandem with 
another effectiveness-of-counsel case, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), a white-collar crime case involving a 
complex check kiting scheme. 
21  See Gregg   v.   Georgia,   428   U.S.   153,   187   (1976)   (Stewart,   Powell,   &   Stevens,   JJ.)   (noting   that   “the  
penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment”).  This  concept  has   recently  been   characterized   as   the  
“foundational”  basis  of  death  penalty  jurisprudence.  See Sara Breslow, Pleading Guilty to Death: Protecting the Capital 
Defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment  Right  to  a  Jury  Sentencing  after  Entering a Guilty Plea, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1249 
(2013). 
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the obligation on the part of courts to ensure that due process is not violated in such a trial. But in 
Strickland, there was no hint at all as to what its impact might be on other cases that were not 
criminal prosecutions, but that potentially involved lengthy periods of institutionalization. 
Over a decade ago, in In re Mental Health of K.G.F.,22 the Montana Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the Strickland standard might not be a sufficient test of adequacy in cases 
involving involuntary civil commitment, relying on state statutory and constitutional sources to 
find   that   “the   right   to  counsel . . . provides an individual subject to an involuntary commitment 
proceeding the right to effective assistance of counsel. In turn, this right affords the individual 
with the right to raise the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging a 
commitment   order.”23 In assessing what constitutes   “effectiveness,”   the   court—startlingly—
eschewed the Strickland standard   as   insufficiently   protective   of   the   “liberty   interests   of  
individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon the 
expiration of a ninety-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge of inferiority of a once 
‘involuntarily  committed’  person  with  a  proven  mental  disorder.”24 Importantly, one of the key 
reasons why Strickland was   seen   as   lacking   was   the   court’s   conclusion   that   “reasonable  
professional  assistance”—the linchpin of Strickland—”cannot  be  presumed  in  a  proceeding   that  
routinely accepts, and even requires, an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and 
generally  disdains  zealous,  adversarial  confrontation.”25 
While no other jurisdiction has yet followed K.G.F.’s  lead,26 the case remains a powerful 
statement  of  how  at  least  one  court  could  “unpack”  the proceedings in question and articulate why 
a more rigorous standard was required. Writing about K.G.F. in 2008, one of the authors of this 
Article   characterized   it   as   “without   doubt   the   most   comprehensive   decision   on   the   scope   and  
meaning   of   the   right   to   counsel   in   this   context   from   any   jurisdiction   in   the  world.”27 This was 
largely because of its willingness to recognize that the Strickland standard might not be sufficient 
in all cases involving subsequent institutionalization. 
In this Article, we are turning our attention to another aspect of the justice system that 
does not involve a pending criminal prosecution but which can potentially lead to lengthy—
indeed, lifetime—periods of institutionalization: proceedings that follow the invocation of 
Sexually  Violent  Predator  Acts  (“SVPA”).  Under  such  Acts: 
“Sexually  violent  predator”  [“SVP”]  means  any  person  who  has  been  convicted  
of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental 
                                                                
22  29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). 
23  Id. at 500. 
24  Id. at 491. 
25  Id. at 492 (citing Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in 
Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 53-54  (1992)).  The  court  describes  Perlin’s  article  as  identifying  the  
“Strickland standard  as   ‘sterile   and  perfunctory’  where   ‘reasonably   effective   assistance’   is   objectively  measured  by   the  
‘prevailing  professional  norms.’”  Id. 
26  1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL & CRIMINAL, § 2B-
11.3, at 96-99 (Supp. 2012). 
27  Michael L. Perlin, “I  Might  Need  a  Good  Lawyer,  Could  Be  Your  Funeral,  My  Trial”:  Global  Clinical  
Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 245 (2008). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/2
CUCOLO-PERLIN, FAR FROM THE TURBULENT SPACE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2015  11:00 AM 
2015] “FAR FROM THE TURBULENT SPACE” 129 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in 
repeat acts of sexual violence.28 
Such individuals can be committed indefinitely as sexually violent predators; in a 
significant percentage of these cases, such commitments are basically life sentences.29 The 
Minnesota appellate courts have reversed judgments on the merits in only four civil commitment 
cases since the adoption of their SVP statute in 1994.30 The Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Kansas 
v. Hendricks paved   the   way   for   such   cases   to   be   classified   as   “civil”   rather   than   “criminal,”  
because   they   involve   “involuntary   civil   confinement   of   a   limited   subclass   of   dangerous  
persons.”31 
The question that we seek to address here is this: Does the Strickland standard apply to 
such cases, or should a more rigorous standard—à la K.G.F.—be employed?32 The answer to this 
question is, we believe, of great importance to the entire criminal justice system (and, of course, 
to the SVPA system), for multiple reasons. As we discuss below, the entire SVPA process is 
cloaked   in   confusion   and   infused  with   fear.  Are   these   cases   “criminal”?  Are   they “civil”?  Are  
they a hybrid? Are the people before the court—who are among the most despised individuals in 
the nation—”worthy”  of   the   assignment  of   counsel?  With   resource problems plaguing both the 
criminal and the civil justice systems, does it make sense  to  “burn”  money  to  appoint  counsel  in  
cases such as these, on behalf of a population whose loathsomeness is seen as a nearly-universal 
“given”? 
Interestingly, there have been multiple cases decided on the failure of counsel to inform a 
client that a guilty plea in a criminal trial might require the client to register as a sex offender. 
Courts have split, finding in some cases that this failure rose to the level of ineffectiveness of 
counsel33 because of the severity of the consequences of potential SVPA commitment34— while 
                                                                
28  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (West 2014) (providing one representative definition of an SVP); see 
generally KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a24  (West  2014)  (providing  one  state’s  SVPA). On the issue of defining 
the requisite risk of recidivism in such cases, see Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
855,  897  (2013)  (arguing  that  “the  risk  of  sexually  violent  recidivism  within  five  years  must  be  at  least  75%”  to  warrant  
label as SVP and avoid due process issues). 
29  See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions:  Involuntary  Commitment  of  “Sexually  Violent  Predators,”  93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 707 (2008). 
30  Sexually Dangerous Person Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 7-8 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.02, subdiv. 16 (2013)). See In re Commitment of Lingl, No. A12-0738, 2012 WL 
5188139, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2012); In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994); In re Hince, No. C9-
94-1366, 1994 WL 637755, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1994); In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994). See also In re Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 433 (Minn. 2007) (reversing a finding of civil 
commitment without prejudice on procedural grounds). 
31  521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). One of the authors of this article, Michael L. Perlin, critiques Hendricks 
extensively  in  “There’s  No  Success  like  Failure  /  and  Failure’s  No  Success  at  All”:  Exposing  the  Pretextuality  of  Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998). For further critique of the decision in Hendricks, see In re Van Orden, 271 
S.W.   3d   579,   592   (Mo.   2008)   (Teitelman,   J.,   dissenting)   (arguing   that   Missouri’s   SVPA   cannot   be   characterized   as  
“remedial,”  and  arguing  that  it  is  instead  “punitive”). 
32  For a recent powerful article, arguing that the right to counsel should be robustly expanded in all criminal 
cases, see John D. King, Beyond   “Life   and   Liberty”:   The   Evolving   Right   to  Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 
(2013). 
33  See, e.g., United States v. Rose, ACM 36508, 2010 WL 4068976, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 
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other courts have rejected these claims, noting that the SVPA proceeding is merely   “civil   and  
regulatory   in   nature.”35 Those cases that found Strickland violations have mostly drawn on the 
Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Padilla v. Kentucky,36 which  held  that  counsel’s  failure  to  advise  his  
client about the potential immigration and deportation consequences of a guilty plea were to be 
assessed by the Strickland standard.37 By contrast, those courts that rejected application of 
Strickland have, by and large, limited Padilla to the context of deportation,38 and thus 
inapplicable to SVPA commitments.39 Those cases that have applied Strickland, following 
Padilla,   have   generally   recognized   that   “lack   of   knowledge   about   serious consequences 
undermines  the  basic  fairness  and  legitimacy  of  a  guilty  plea,”40 but few cases have extended this 
                                                                
2010), aff’d, 71 M.J. 138 (2012); Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477 (Tenn. 2011); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 896 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2011); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). In Taylor, the Georgia appellate court relied 
on American Bar Association standards for criminal justice in support of its position that professional standards require 
informing defendants of the consequences of guilty pleas in such cases. See Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388. 
 These   cases   are   cited   in   Colleen   Shanahan’s   Significant Entanglements: A Framework for the Civil 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1424 (2012). See also Colleen Connolly, Sliding 
Down the Slippery Slope of the Sixth Amendment: Arguments for Interpreting Padilla v. Kentucky Narrowly and Limiting 
the Burden It Places on the Criminal Justice System, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 745, 777 (2012).  
34  State  v.  Bellamy,  835  A.2d  1231,  1238  (N.J.  2003)  (holding  that  “when  the  consequence  of a plea may be 
so severe that   a   defendant  may   be   confined   for   the   remainder   of   his   or   her   life   [under  New   Jersey’s   Sexually  Violent  
Predator   Act],   fundamental   fairness   demands   that   the   trial   court   inform   defendant   of   that   possible   consequence”)  
(emphasis added). For a discussion of this case as a part of a move away from a formalistic distinction between 
“collateral”  and  “direct”  consequences,  see  Roberts,  supra note 29, at 721. 
35  See, e.g., Shanahan, supra note 33, at 1424-1425 n.221, discussing Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 
1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *9-10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010), and Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259, 
at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012). 
36  559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, although   deportation   was   characterized   as   “not,   in   a   strict   sense,   a  
criminal   sanction”   and   although   “removal   proceedings   are   civil   in   nature,”   the   Court   granted   that   deportation   is   an  
especially  “severe  ‘penalty,’”  “intimately  related  to   the  criminal  process.”   Id. at  365.  On  the  significance  of  “ostensibly  
non-penal   sanctions”   in   general,   see  Wayne   Logan,   Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1103 
(2013). Beyond the scope of this Article is the important question of the special issues raised when a person subject to 
deportation is mentally ill. See, e.g., Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally 
Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 523 (2012); Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, 
Applying Method to the Madness: The Right to Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in 
Immigration Proceedings, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2013); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The 
Case for a Right to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929 (2013). 
37  Compare Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that the due process clause did not 
automatically require provision of counsel at civil contempt proceeding), with Tom  Pryor’s  criticism  in  Note,  Turner  v.  
Rogers, The Right to Counsel, and the Deficiencies of Mathews v. Eldridge, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1854 (2013). On the 
question of the application of Strickland to  counsel’s  incorrect  advice  about  parole,  see  Webb  v.  State,  334  S.W.3d  126,  
130-131 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (finding that incorrect advice from counsel regarding parole eligibility after plea bargaining 
was sufficient for a prima facie ineffective assistance claim, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing). 
38  See, e.g., Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012). 
39  See Shanahan, supra note 33, at 1420-21 (discussing cases finding Padilla inapplicable, because there are 
not  “near-automatic  outcomes”  in  SVPA  cases,  as  there  are  in  deportation  cases  following  guilty  pleas).  On  the  potential  
scope of Padilla, see Joanna Rosenberg, A Game-Changer? The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the Collateral 
Consequences Rule and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407 (2014). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/2
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concept to notification of the consequences of the SVPA.41 
State v. Myers demonstrates a common approach to due process and knowledge of a 
state’s  SVPA  during   the  guilty  plea  process.42 After pleading guilty to sexual assault of a child, 
Robert Myers moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that it was not knowing and voluntary 
because the trial court had failed to   inform   him   about   Wisconsin’s   Sexually   Violent   Person  
Commitments Act.43 The court noted that because commitment is not an automatic result of the 
conviction, Myers had no due process right to be informed prior to entering his plea.44 Myers 
arguments   have   received   “a   cool   reception   by   the   courts,”45 but the case has encouraged 
prosecutors  to  include  the  discussion  of  these  topics  as  “part  of  the  plea  negotiation process and 
plea  colloquy”  to  avoid  potential  litigation  on  this  issue.46 
As Professor Roberts notes: 
 Involuntary commitment under an SVPA is a clear-cut case in which 
due process would require a pre-plea warning under . . . [a] proposed 
reasonableness test. Due to its highly severe nature, any reasonable defendant 
would place significant weight on the possibility of lifelong involuntary 
commitment as a sexually violent predator in the decision-making process 
                                                                
40  Roberts, supra note 29,  at  721.  Professor  Roberts  further  notes  that  “[i]t  is  difficult  to  maintain  that  a  plea  
without  such  knowledge  is  truly  a  voluntary,  knowing,  and  intelligent  act.”  Id. 
41  State  v.  Bellamy,  835  A.2d  1231,  1235  (N.J.  2003)  (holding  that  “prior   to  accepting  a  guilty  plea   to  a  
predicate  offense,”  trial  courts  must  inform  defendants  of  possible  consequences  under  the  Act). 
42  544 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
43  Id. at 610; see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01-.14 (West 2013). 
44  Id. at 610-11. See Thomas  v.  State,  365  S.W.  3d  537,  541  (Tex.  Ct.  App.  2012)  (recognizing  that  “SVP  
commitment  is  neither  a  penalty  nor  an  automatic  result  of  criminal  convictions”);;  Blaise  v.  State,  No.  10-0466, 801 N.W. 
2d 627,   at   *3   (Iowa   Ct.   App.  May   25,   2011)   (holding   commitment   as   a   sexually   violent   predator   is   “not   a   definite,  
immediate,   or   automatic   result”   plaintiff’s   conviction).   See also Roberts, supra note 29, at 712. Professor Roberts 
explains:  
The [Myers] court noted that involuntary commitment would not automatically flow from the fact of 
Myers’s   conviction.   Instead,   “Myers   will   have   the   full   benefit   of the   [commitment   law’s]  
procedures,   due   process,   and   an   independent   trial.”   Since   commitment  was   thus   only   a   potential  
future consequence of his plea, Myers had no due process right to know about it prior to entering his 
plea. 
Id. 
 There is a stark contrast between decisions like this and cases mandating counsel in misdemeanor criminal 
cases. Cf. Argersinger  v.  Hamlin,  407  U.S.  25,  37  (1972)  (holding  “that  absent  a  knowing  and  intelligent  waiver,  no  person  
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by 
counsel  at  his  trial”);;  Rodriguez  v.  Rosenblatt,  277  A.2d  216,  223  (N.J.  1971)  (mandating  the  provision  of  counsel  if,  in  
misdemeanor  prosecution,  defendant  faces  “consequence  of  magnitude,”  such  as  loss  of  driver’s  license).  On  how  failure  
to comply with the Argersinger mandate  regularly  leaves  “Gideon’s  promise  .  .   .  unfulfilled,”  see  Erica  Hashimoto,  The 
Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1047 (2013). 
45  Brian K. Holmgren, Sexually Violent Predator Statutes: Implications for Prosecutors and Their 
Communities, 32 PROSECUTOR 20, 32 (1998). 
46  Id. 
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leading up to a guilty plea. Not every defendant will ultimately decide, due to 
the potential for commitment, to reject all plea offers. However, this is 
information that reasonable defendants will rely upon in making 
knowledgeable, voluntary decisions about whether to plead guilty to a 
qualifying offense in the states with SVPAs.47 
But these cases consider Strickland only within the context of the initial criminal 
proceeding.48 Our focus here is on the SVPA proceeding itself, where there is some case authority 
holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel.49 Of the cases that have considered 
Strickland challenges (thus assuming a right to representation), virtually all have rejected 
Strickland-based arguments.50 
We assert that there is such a right to counsel, but that Strickland—especially given the 
pallid interpretations of Strickland that have passed constitutional muster in felony cases51—is 
itself an insufficient predicate for a finding of constitutionality in such proceedings. In the wake 
of K.G.F., a more searching standard (albeit a different one from K.G.F.) must instead be 
employed.52 
We say this for three main reasons: first, SVPA proceedings normally turn on the 
interpretation of several controversial psychometric tests.53 However, there is no evidence that the 
                                                                
47  Roberts, supra note 29, at 726. 
48  See Shanahan, supra note 33,   at  1434   (“Courts  can  ask:   is   the  consequence  significant as an objective 
matter  and  to  the  particular  defendant,  and  is  the  consequence  entangled  with  the  criminal  process?”). 
49  See, e.g., Ramsey v. Runion, No. 2:11cv396, 2012 WL 3883378, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2012) (stating 
“there  is  no  federally  cognizable  right  to  effective  assistance  of  counsel  in  a  civil  commitment  proceeding”);;  but see, e.g., 
People v. Bowles, 932 N.Y.S. 2d 112, 117 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that the right to counsel emanates from Fourteenth 
Amendment  due  process  clause  rather  than  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel  clause,  because  “sex  offender  adjudication  
is  not  part  of  a  criminal  action”). 
50  See infra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
51  See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 3, at 123-38 (discussing cases). 
52  For a comprehensive analysis of why Strickland should apply to SVPA cases, see In re Ontiberos, 287 
P.3d 855, 867 (Kan. 2012) (applying Strickland “because   [the  defendant’s]   right   to  counsel  arises   from  a  constitutional 
right  similar  to  the  rights  attendant  to  a  criminal  trial”). 
53  Many independent experts base their predictions heavily on psychometric tests. These tests include 
“actuarial  tests,”  also  known  as  “future  risk  assessments,”  such  as  the  Violence  Risk  Appraisal  Guide  (“VRAG”),  the  Sex  
Offender  Risk  Appraisal  Guide  (“SORAG”),  the  Rapid  Risk  Assessment  for  Sex  Offender  Recidivism  (“RRASOR”),  and  
the   Minnesota   Sex   Offender   Screening   Tool   (“MnSOST-R”).   See generally VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT 
OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (2d ed. 2006); VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: 
APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 141-190 (1998); Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered 
Offenders: The Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315 (1993); R. Karl 
Hanson, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BRIEF ACTUARIAL RISK SCALE FOR SEXUAL OFFENSE RECIDIVISM 18-19 (1997); 
Douglas L. Epperson et al., Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool—Revised (MnSOST-R) Technical Paper: 
Development, Validation, and Recommended Risk Level Cut Scores (Dec. 2003), http://rsoresearch.files.wordpress.com 
/2012/01/ia-state-study.pdf; Richard Hamill, Recidivism of Sex Offenders: What You Need to Know, CRIM. JUST., Winter 
2001, at 24, 30.  
 An oft-used actuarial test, the Static-99, is a ten-item assessment instrument created by Drs. R. Karl Hanson 
and David Thornton for use with male sexual offenders who are at least eighteen year of age at the time of their release to 
the community. It is the most widely implemented sex offender risk assessment instrument in the world, extensively used 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/2
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bulk of lawyers involved in such cases have any familiarity with these instruments, or with the 
literature about their validity and reliability. 
Second, although the Supreme Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma54 that a defendant has a 
right to an independent expert in a felony trial, there is very little analogous case or statutory law 
with regard to SVPA matters.55 Thus, counsel may be less likely or able to competently launch a 
defense in such cases. 
Third and finally, the population at issue is the most despised group of individuals in the 
nation.56 Judges,   jurors   and   lawyers   share   society’s   general   revulsion   towards   sexually   violent  
predators.57 Although the bar pays lip service to the bromide that legal counsel is available for all, 
no matter how unpopular the cause, the reality is that there are few volunteers for the job of 
representing these individuals,   and   that   the   public’s   enmity   has   a   chilling   effect   on   legal  
representation in this area. 
For all of these reasons, we propose a new standard in SVPA hearings: to be effective, 
counsel must demonstrate familiarity with the psychometric tests regularly employed at such 
hearings, and counsel must have access to relevant expert witnesses at no cost to the person facing 
sex offender adjudication. This would be done in the same manner envisioned by the Ake Court in 
                                                                
in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many European nations. R. Karl Hanson & David 
Thornton, Static-99 Tally Sheet, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-
rules_e71.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). According to Dr. Hanson, the RRASOR and Static-99 developmental samples 
were derived from a limited number of small, non-random samples from mostly Canadian and English institutions, with 
one U.S. sample included in RRASOR. R. KARL HANSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BRIEF ACTUARIAL RISK SCALE FOR 
SEXUAL OFFENSE RECIDIVISM 14 (1997), available at http://www.publications.gc.ca/site/eng/72871/publication.html; see 
also R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial 
Scales, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2000); R. Karl Hanson & Andrew J.R. Harris, Where Should We Intervene? Dynamic 
Predictors of Sexual Offense Recidivism, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6 (2000).  
 The samples used in the Static-99 tool were revised a handful of times, yet there were still problems in 
determining risk accurately. R. KARL HANSON & KELLEY MORTON-BOURGON, PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL RECIDIVISM: AN 
UPDATED META-ANALYSIS 32 (2004), available at http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/hansonandmortonbourgon2004.pdf. 
The sampled majority was released from maximum-security prisons or mental health institutions, and thus may represent 
higher risk groups than typical sex offenders. While intending the tools to be applicable on an international scale, there is 
no sign the developers made any attempt to conduct truly representative sampling to satisfy scientific principles for a more 
global application. Another issue is the fact that the developmental samples included inconsistent definitions of the 
outcome variable of recidivism, including charges, readmissions, and/or reconvictions, and used widely varying 
timeframes for follow-up. 
54  470 U.S. 68, 85 (1985). 
55  But see Commonwealth v. Curnutte, 871 A.2d 839, 842-44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that an 
indigent defendant with private counsel was entitled to a state-funded expert for his sexually violent predator hearing). 
56  See Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism through Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) 
(“Currently,  no  other  population is more despised, more vilified, more subject to media misrepresentation, and more likely 
to  be  denied  basic  human  rights.”). 
57  See id.; Kevin J. Breer, Beyond Hendricks: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Kansas v. 
Crane and  Other  Issues  Concerning  Kansas’s  Sexually  Violent  Predator  Act, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2002, at 13 (“Sex  
offenders   are   the   scourge   of   modern   America,   the   ‘irredeemable   monsters’   who   prey   on   the   innocent.   Although this 
revulsion  is  perhaps  now  more  widespread  and  more  acute,  it  is  not  unprecedented  in  the  annals  of  American  justice.”). 
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insanity cases.58 Further, we believe that the use of such a standard would best comport with the 
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.59 
This Article will proceed in this manner. First, we will look at the relevant issues that 
surround the question of the right to counsel in such cases. Then, we will examine the three issues 
listed above supporting a more stringent effectiveness standard. After that, we will consider the 
meaning of therapeutic jurisprudence and its application to these cases. We will then offer some 
modest conclusions. 
The   title   of   this   Article   comes   from   Bob   Dylan’s   complex   song   Jokerman.60 While 
discussing   the   song’s  meaning,  critic  Michael  Gray  points  out   that   it   “insist[s]   that   ‘evil’   is   not  
‘out there,’  among  ‘the  others,’  but  is   inside  us  all.”61 Our refusal to acknowledge this reality—
and our tendency to see sex offenders  as  a  “less  than  human”  subgroup  of  “the  other”62—enables, 
and indeed encourages us, to ignore the issues that we seek to address in this paper. We believe 
that  Bob  Dylan’s words are therefore crucial to understanding the legal issues we discuss in this 
Article. 
I. A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS63 
An individual facing sex offender civil commitment64 may be assigned counsel, but is 
not necessarily afforded the absolute right to have an appointed attorney.65 Jurisdictions vary on 
the availability and scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.66 For instance, in Kansas, if a 
person is indigent, the state is required to provide her with both the assistance of counsel and 
                                                                
58  See Ake, 470 U.S. at 85. 
59  For discussions of the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in the representation of persons alleged to be 
sexually violent predators, see generally Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56, at 31-42; Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. 
Perlin, “They’re  Planting  Stories  In  the  Press”:  The  Impact  of  Media  Distortions  on  Sex  Offender  Law  and  Policy,  3 U. 
DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 240-45  (2013).  On  therapeutic  jurisprudence  (“TJ”)  in  this  context,  see  infra Part III. 
60  BOB DYLAN, Jokerman, on INFIDELS (Columbia Records 1983). One of the authors (MLP) has explored 
the meaning of this song in other written works, including in Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend  to  the  
Martyr,  A  Friend  to  the  Woman  of  Shame”:  Thinking  About  the  Law,  Shame  and  Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. 
JUST. 1 (2014). 
61  MICHAEL GRAY, THE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 364 (2008). 
62  See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56, at 30. 
63  This section is adapted from 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER E. CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
CIVIL & CRIMINAL (3d ed. forthcoming 2015).  
64  For a comprehensive consideration of state statutes pertaining to the civil commitment of sex offenders, 
see NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Civil%20Commitment-April%202012.pdf. 
65  See Ramsey v. Runion, No. 2:11cv396, 2012 WL 3883378, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2012) (stating that 
“there  is  no  federally  cognizable  right  to  effective  assistance  of  counsel  in  a  civil  commitment  proceeding”). 
66  For an example of how one jurisdiction defines the scope of the right to counsel in this context, see In re 
Commitment of Dodge,   989  N.E.2d  1159,   1167   (Ill.  App.  Ct.   2013)   (measuring   a   sexually   violent   defendant’s   right   to  
effective assistance up to the standards provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) despite that the 
proceedings were civil in nature). 
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examination by mental health professionals.67 The individual also receives the right to present and 
cross-examine witnesses, and the opportunity to review documentary evidence presented by the 
state.68 Yet the right to counsel at each stage in the commitment process is not automatically 
granted, and has been denied during pre-commitment evaluations69 as well as during the 
psychological evaluation for annual review hearings.70 The Kansas Court of Appeals has 
mandated that if appointed counsel for a committed person under the SVPA is not engaged, not 
responsive, or otherwise not active, the court is obligated to investigate or to appoint new counsel, 
because of a clear statutory requirement that   counsel   be   provided   “at   all   stages   of   the  
proceedings.”71 Other jurisdictions have found that the Sixth Amendment attaches once the 
                                                                
67  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06  (West  2014)  (stating  that  upon  the  individual’s  request,  the  court  must  
determine whether such services are necessary). As to self-representation, see In re Det. of Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 800 
(Wash. 1999) (en banc) (holding a defendant must unequivocally request the right to represent himself), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 1125 (2001). 
68  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(g) (West 2014). 
69  See, e.g.,   Greenfield   v.  N.J.   Dep’t   of   Corr.,   888  A.2d   507,   507-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) 
(finding a sex offender had no due process right to review materials or meet with a committee addressing his possible 
referral  to  the  state’s  attorney  general  for  commitment  as  a  sexually  violent  predator).   
 Notably, New York considers civil management to be a collateral rather than a direct consequence of 
conviction. See, e.g., People v. Harnett, 945 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 2011) (concluding that failure to inform a defendant who 
pleads guilty to a sex offense of the possibility of being civilly committed under state SVPA does not result in an 
automatic invalidation of the plea); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 976 (2d Cir. 1983) (ruling that legal counsel 
is not required at pre-hearing psychiatric interviews). Compare Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1978) (ruling that 
defendant is not entitled to counsel at a psychiatric exam), with Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) (ruling that in the absence of a showing that counsel would interfere, he should be permitted to observe the 
psychiatric examination either directly or indirectly).  
 Admittedly, a number of courts have concluded that a civil commitment proceeding should not be equated with 
a criminal prosecution. E.g., Project Release 722 F.2d at 974-75  (stating  that  the  court  is  “not  prepared to invoke the same 
criminal   procedural   standards   required   in   the   criminal   context”   for   the   civil   commitment   context);;   see also Goetz v. 
Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the necessity of prioritizing psychiatric advice in civil commitment 
cases). However, the rationale for this conclusion is not that the deprivations suffered by an individual subject to the civil 
commitment process are less severe than those suffered by a convicted criminal defendant, but rather that civil 
commitment proceedings are less adversarial in nature because one of its purposes is to provide mental health treatment 
that will benefit the subject of commitment. See Goetz, 967 F.2d at 34-35; Ughetto, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.  
 For an example of the purposes of civil  commitment  in  the  context  of  a  child’s  case,  see  Parham  v.  J.R.,  442  
U.S. 584, 600-01  (1979)  (“The  state  through  its  voluntary  commitment  procedures  does  not  ‘label’  the  child;;  it  provides  a  
diagnosis and treatment that medical specialists conclude the child  requires.”). 
70  See In re Det. of Petersen, 980 P.2d 1204, 1217 (Wash. 1999) (ruling that the defendant failed to show 
that  his  annual  review  was  invalid  “because  he  was  denied  the  presence of  counsel  at  the  examination”). 
71  See In re Miles, 213 P.3d 1077, 1083 (Kan. Ct.  App.  2009),  which  quotes   from  one  prisoner’s  pro  se  
submission to the court: 
   The problem Petitioners are experiencing is with the attorneys appointed by the Court of 
Wyandotte County. These attorneys of record rarely, if ever, consult with their clients during the 
annual review period and almost never send any documentation as to any judgment or action taken 
in their case. Hence the patient has no alternative to but to file his own petition without the 
assistance of counsel. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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individual has been screened for civil commitment and detained post-conviction, thus implicating 
a right to effective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal proceeding.72 New Jersey and 
New York both statutorily mandate that counsel be assigned in the SVPA process once an 
individual is temporarily committed and awaiting his initial civil commitment hearing or trial.73 
Questions regarding the quality of counsel and the threshold of constitutional rights have 
been considered in cases where defendants have sought to withdraw a plea bargain where they 
were not informed of the potential consequences of a sex offender conviction. The Supreme Court 
has yet to address this issue, and there is a lack of uniformity in the state courts. New Jersey 
appears to be one of the only states that requires counsel to inform the defendant that pleading 
guilty might result in sexual offender civil commitment.74 Other state courts have mandated a duty 
to inform when the plea would result in sexual offender registration while on probation.75 Many 
state courts have determined that civil commitment is merely a collateral consequence and not a 
direct result of the plea, and therefore there is no duty to inform.76 The South Carolina Supreme 
Court ruled in 2005 that, although the criminal conviction is the triggering  event   for   the   state’s  
SVPA, the attorney had no duty to inform the offender about civil commitment before the 
offender pleaded guilty.77 The Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned that, even if the defendant was 
                                                                
72  But see In re McCracken, 551 S.E.2d 235, 240 (S.C. 2001) (finding that the Sixth Amendment was not 
implicated because the defendant failed to show the case was a criminal proceeding); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 
1012-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no constitutional right to counsel   under   that   state’s   SVPA).  See generally 
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (discussing how underfunding the agencies that provide 
indigent defense counsel endangers the right to counsel).  
73  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.29.a (West 2015) (stating that a person subject to involuntary commitment 
shall have counsel present at the hearing and shall not be permitted to appear at the hearing without counsel); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §  10.06(c)  (McKinney  2014)  (“Promptly  upon  the  filing  of  a  sex  offender  civil  management  petition, 
. . . the court shall appoint counsel in any case where the respondent is financially unable to obtain counsel. The court shall 
appoint  the  mental  hygiene  legal  service  if  possible.”). 
74  See State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1236 (N.J. 2003) (finding that prior to accepting a guilty plea to a 
predicate   offense,   trial   courts  must   inform   defendants   of   possible   consequences   of   civil   commitment   under   the   state’s  
SVPA). 
75  See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that counsel was 
constitutionally deficient for failing to advise client that pleading guilty would subject the client to sex offender 
registration requirements). 
76  See, e.g., In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that commitment 
proceedings were civil in nature and thus not improperly used by state to subject offender to greater punishment than was 
imposed pursuant to plea bargain); In re Det. of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (explaining that 
because civil commitment is not criminal punishment, it was not a foregone conclusion that respondent would be civilly 
committed, and therefore commitment, like sex offender registration, is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty and 
does not violate the plea agreement), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1125 (2001); People v. Moore, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 661 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding any commitment the defendant might suffer under the SVPA would not be a direct consequence 
of his plea); In re Hay,  953  P.2d  666,  676   (Kan.  1998)   (finding  a  “plea   agreement   is   immaterial  as   far  as  proceedings  
under   the   [SVP]   Act   are   concerned”   where   commitment   is   based on   a   defendant’s   “mental   ailment   and   present  
dangerousness”);;   In re Kunshier, 521 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that county did not violate plea 
agreement by invoking civil commitment statute against patient because it is not criminal punishment, but rather civil 
treatment). 
77  Page v. State, 615 S.E.2d 740, 742 (S.C. 2005). For an insightful look into collateral consequences 
discussing the Page case, see Roberts, supra note 29, at 693-700. 
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informed of the potential for civil commitment, the chance of losing at trial and facing a longer 
prison sentence would deter a guilty plea retraction.78 The question remains whether  a  defendant’s  
decision to plead guilty takes into account the fact that a potential life sentence attached to civil 
commitment. 
Although securing a constitutional right to counsel in civil commitment is an initial step, 
it is crucial that we not merely consider the right to counsel, but also that we discuss that right in 
combination with the quality of counsel and her resources and knowledge in this area of the law. 
In the following subsections, we will explore the unique circumstances associated with 
representation of this population, and why a defense attorney needs to have a working knowledge 
of all of the collateral consequences that might result from committing a sexually motivated 
offense or being labeled a sexual predator. 
A. Issues Related to Psychometric Tests 
Expert   predictions   of   future   violence   “central   to   the   ultimate   question . . . whether 
petitioners   suffer   from   a   mental   abnormality   or   personality   disorder”79 are believed to be 
necessary in the civil commitment of sexual offenders.80 The concept that humans can accurately 
predict the criminal or aberrant behavior of other humans in the long-term future has created the 
need for the development of actuarial  instruments  that  allegedly  remove  the  “human”  element of 
error when predicting future risk.81 
In greatly simplified terms, there are two broad approaches to conducting risk 
assessments to predict future dangerous sexual behavior: clinical judgment and actuarial 
assessment.82 The clinical approach requires evaluators to consider a wide range of risk factors 
and then form an overall opinion concerning future dangerousness.83 The actuarial approach 
evaluates a limited set of predictors and then combines these variables using a predetermined, 
numerical weighting system to determine future risk of re-offense,84 which may be adjusted (or 
not) by expert evaluators considering potentially important factors not included in the actuarial 
measure.85 
                                                                
78  Bussell v. State, 963 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
79  In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993) (en banc), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 71.09.010-.903 (West 2014), as stated in In re Det. of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 720-21 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
80  See Thorell,  72  P.3d  at  728  (concluding  that  diagnosis  of  a  mental  disorder  is  not  “sufficient  for  a  jury  to  
find  that  the  person  presents  a  serious  risk  of  future  sexual  violence”  unless coupled with additional evidence, including 
evidence  of  prior  sexually  violent  behavior”  and  expert  testimony);;   In re Det. of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 2002) (concluding that if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise). 
81  See In re Commitment of Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Altenbernd, C.J., 
concurring) (discussing the use of actuarial instruments in predicting future human behavior in violent sex offenders). 
82  See, e.g., DENNIS M. DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENTS AND 
BEYOND, 103-04 (2002). 
83  Id. at 104. 
84  Id. at 105. 
85  Id. at 103-104.  
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Courts must contend with finding the correct standard that balances the potential for 
unfair  prejudice  against  the  evidence’s  probative  value.86 In spite of the knowledge that testimony 
predicting the future dangerousness of sexually violent predators is undoubtedly prejudicial, some 
courts have deemed actuarial assessments as appropriate tools that help the professional draw 
inferences about the potential for recidivism from historical data, or the collective experience of 
other professionals who have assessed sex offenders for potential recidivism.87 The purpose of 
actuarial assessment testimony is to assist the fact-finder in determining whether a sexually 
violent predator is likely to commit future violent acts. Recent case law holds that the probative 
value of such testimony is significant and directly relevant to whether an individual should be 
committed as a sexually violent predator.88 However, questions as to the ethical usage and 
accuracy of these predictive instruments remain unanswered,89 despite that these tools are widely 
accepted by the experts who use them.90 
The introduction of actuarial tools in the risk assessment of sexual offenders has 
compromised the validity of the forensic psychological testimony presented in such cases, and has 
pitted experts against one another in a battle to determine which method of prediction is superior. 
As Florida appellate chief judge Chris Altenbernd explained in his concurring opinion in In re 
Commitment of Burton, the relevant scientific community that must generally accept these tests in 
order for them to be admissible in court should include a broader group of clinical and 
experimental psychologists and psychiatrists—rather than the small and arguably biased subgroup 
of professionals who earn a living by testifying about their results.91 Actuarial approaches use 
statistical analysis to identify a number of risk factors that assist in the prediction of future 
dangerousness. Since actuarial models are based on statistical analysis of small sample sizes, they 
have a variety of potential predictive shortcomings.92 The debate rages on, and supporters of both 
actuarial and clinical assessment tools argue for outright rejection of the other.93 
                                                                
86  See generally Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1112 (analyzing, under the Frye standard, the use of psychometric 
tests to determine future dangerousness of people convicted of sex crimes).  
87  See, e.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (admitting actuarial 
assessments  into  evidence,  but  noting  that  “[u]nlike  DNA  and  other  types  of  ‘scientific’  evidence,  these  risk  assessment  
tools do not have an aura of scientific infallibility . . .  and  their  predictive  value  is  far  less  than  100%”). 
88  In re Girard, 257 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
89  See Burton, 884 So.  2d  at  1120  (Altenbernd,  C.J.,  concurring)  (“I,  for  one,  do  not  yet  have  faith  that  it  is  
wise for the judiciary or for society as a whole to rush down this new path before we are confident that both the science of 
jurisprudence and the sciences of psychology  and  psychiatry  are  up  to  this  awesome  task.”). 
90  In Thorell, the court cited an amicus brief prepared by the Washington Association for the Treatment of 
Sexual Abusers for the proposition that  “the  proof  of  the  scientific  community’s  acceptance  of  actuarial  instruments  is  that  
the  failure  to  use  such  instruments  constitutes  an  ethical  violation  for  its  members.” 72 P.3d at 725. 
91  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1118 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). Judge Altenbernd served as chief judge from 
2003 to 2005. See Judge Chris Altenbernd, FLA. 2D. DIST. CT. OF APPEAL, http://www.2dca.org/judges/bio 
/altenbernd.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).  
92  See Harry M. Hoberman, Dangerousness and Sex Offenders-Assessing Risk for Future Sex Offenses, in 2 
THE SEXUAL PREDATOR, 11-1,11-16 (Anita Schlank ed., 2001). 
93  Compare VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 171 
(1998), with Campbell,   986   P.2d   at   787   (seeking   to   exclude   the   State’s   expert’s   testimony   because   he   “questions   the  
ability for anyone to ‘predict  dangerousness’”).  The  Supreme  Court  of  Washington  rejected  the  defendant’s  argument  on  
the basis of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-903 (1983), holding predictions of future dangerousness should be 
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The use of actuarial tools raises multiple issues. In a thorough and probing analysis of 
these tests, Professors Eric Janus and Robert Prentky have concluded that,  “to  a  greater  or  lesser  
extent,   all   ARA   [“actuarial   risk   assessment”]   instruments   have   shortcomings,   and   these  
shortcomings detract from the reliability of the instruments.”94 The authors note that there are 
three potential sources of prejudice from ARA testimony: first, that the scientific and statistical 
nature of actuarial assessments will unduly influence the fact-finder into giving it more weight 
and   credibility   than   it   deserves,   and   that   the  principle  of   “actuarial   superiority”  will   exacerbate  
this  tendency;;  second,  that  juries  will  ignore  the  lack  of  “fit”  between  the  actuarially-derived risk 
and the legally relevant risk, thus giving ARA too much weight; and third, that the reality that the 
“incriminating  significance”  of  statistical  probabilities  is  “obscure.”95 
Discussed below are four of the most common issues that have been debated regarding 
the usage of actuarial instruments: (1) admissibility under evidentiary review standards; (2) 
lawyers’  and  judges’  familiarity with these tests; (3) concern regarding the potential for juries to 
confuse  or  misinterpret  the  results;;  and  (4)  experts’  lack  of  training  to  administer  these  tests. 
1. Admissibility 
Generally, the standard of review for admitting expert testimony must satisfy the tests 
articulated in either Frye v. United States96 or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.97 
Under the Frye test, novel scientific evidence is admissible when the relevant scientific 
community has generally accepted the reliability of the underlying theory or principle.98 A Frye 
issue involves a mixed question of law and fact. If the evidence does not involve new scientific 
principles or methods of proof, a Frye inquiry is unnecessary.99 In reviewing a decision based on 
Frye, an appellate court may look beyond the record to scientific literature and secondary legal 
                                                                
admitted and evaluated by the fact-finder. 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court has found as fact that actuarial instruments are at least as reliable, if not more 
so, than clinical interviews. In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1170-71 (N.J. 1996). For some criticisms of Barefoot, see PERLIN, 
supra note 3, at 19-28. 
94  Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: 
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1472 (2003). 
95  Id. at 1487. 
96  293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (designating general acceptance by the scientific community as the 
standard for the admissibility of expert testimony). See also KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 225   (1999)   (noting   that   “[t]he   ‘Frye rule’  was   applied  by   federal  
courts  for  more  than  fifty  years  and  is  still  enforced  by  many  state  courts”). 
97  509 U.S. 579, 586-591 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes Frye, and 
discussing multi-factor test for determining admissibility of expert evidence). Frye has since been superseded in federal 
courts. See infra note 98. 
98  Frye,   293   F.   at   1014   (“Just   when   a   scientific   principle   or   discovery   crosses   the   line   between   the  
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have  gained  general  acceptance  in  the  particular  field  in  which  it  belongs.”).  See also Thorell, 72 P.3d at 724 (discussing 
whether actuarial instruments should be viewed as novel scientific evidence). 
99  See, e.g., State v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747, 761 (Wash. 1994) (en banc). 
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authority.100 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court rejected Frye’s   general   acceptance   test,   and   instead  
emphasized  the  trial  judge’s  independent  “gatekeeping”  function.101 The Daubert test instructs the 
trier of fact to consider whether (1) the theory or technique is scientific knowledge that can be and 
has been tested; (2) the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) 
the theory or technique has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) the theory or technique is 
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.102 If a trial court considers these 
factors,  “the  court  should  focus  solely  on  the  principles  and methodology, not on the conclusions 
that  they  generate.”103 In short, Daubert places the reliability assessment on trial judges, and, in 
contrast, Frye delegates to the scientific community the duty to determine whether the evidence in 
question has gained general acceptance. Daubert has been considered by some as potentially more 
generous than the Frye standard, thus substantively minimizing the role of the general 
acceptability standard in federal court.104 
Actuarial tools used in sex offender civil commitment cases have faced a number of 
challenges105 under both Frye106 and Daubert.107 Under both standards, state courts have generally 
                                                                
100  State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1312 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). 
101  Janus & Prentky, supra note 94, at 1460-61   (highlighting   the   Court’s   emphasis   on   the   trial   judge’s  
gatekeeping  function  in  “determining  at  the  threshold  whether  the  ‘reasoning  or  methodology  underlying  the  testimony  is  
scientifically  valid  and  whether  that  reasoning  or  methodology  can  be  applied  to  the  facts  in  issue’”). 
102  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; see also id. at   596   (remarking   that   “[v]igorous   cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means 
of  attacking  shaky  but  admissible  evidence”);;  see also Janus & Prenky, supra note 94, at 1462-63  (“A  strong  argument  
could be made for requiring a rather high level of reliability for risk assessment testimony. After all, the consequences 
resting on the assessments are momentous—long-term loss of liberty, on the one hand, and prevention of potential sexual 
violence on the other. Under such a rigorous standard, it is likely that no risk assessment testimony—clinical or 
actuarial—would  pass  muster.”).     
103  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
104  See, e.g., James Aaron George, Note, Offender Profiling and Expert Testimony: Scientifically Valid or 
Glorified Results?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 221, 232-36 (2008) (discussing how Daubert is generally broader than Frye, though 
federal courts have applied it strictly). But see Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: 
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 715-16 (2011) (suggesting that 
Daubert can be a more limiting standard than Frye in situations where general acceptance of a given method exists, but 
where the method involves evidence considered specious and thus inadmissible). 
 On  how  courts  generally  “lower  the  bar”  in  criminal  cases  involving  Daubert challenges  to  the  state’s  case,  see 
Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 315, 317 & n.22 (2008). See also 
Déirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 382-84 (2007). 
105  Some challenges have suggested that such actuarial instruments are inadmissible profiling tools because 
they do nothing more than assign values to characteristics in an effort to fit an individual within a profile, thus purely 
identifying a person as a member of a group likely to commit a crime. See, e.g., Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1119 (Altenbernd, 
C.J., concurring) (suggesting that actuarial instruments appear to have a high error rate and may be dysfunctional profiling 
tools due to the manner in which they assign values to certain characteristics and sort individuals); Thorell, 72 P.3d at 724 
(discussing the   defendant’s   argument   that   actuarial   assessment   methods   are   scientifically   novel   and   thus   inadmissible  
under  Washington’s  version  of  the  Frye standard). 
106  See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present and Future of the General Acceptance 
Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 401 (2001) (stating that Frye states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and 
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held the most frequently used actuarial tools—the Static-99 and the MnSOST-R—to be 
admissible.108 A majority of these courts found the tests to be reliable on the asserted basis that 
they are generally accepted by the scientific community, and therefore require no further 
validation.109 
In the case of In re Commitment of R.S., the   appellate   court   upheld   the   trial   judge’s 
decision  that  “the  actuarial  instruments  were  admissible in their own right and as the basis of an 
expert   opinion.”110 The court reasoned that, even though other   appellate   courts   had   “not  
specifically and articulately approved actuarials [sic] under Frye,”   the   fact   that   they   accepted  
                                                                
Washington). See, e.g., In re Lourash, 807 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that a sex offender was entitled 
to a Frye hearing on the admissibility of any expert testimony predicated on the use of Hansen-Bussière  “meta-analysis,”  
the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R), or Static-99 actuarial instruments to measure the risk 
of recidivism). 
107  See Hamilton, supra note 104,   at   737   (“The   few   courts   to   analyze   actuarial   risk   assessments   under  
Daubert have   found   them   admissible.”);;   Alice   B.   Lustre,   Annotation,   Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of 
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001) (compiling list of states that apply Daubert 
or similar tests, states that continue to apply Frye, states that apply some combination of both Daubert and Frye factors, 
and states that have developed their own tests). 
108  See, e.g., In re Det. of Taylor, 134 P.3d 254, 259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (reiterating that actuarial 
instruments to determine future dangerousness satisfy the Frye standards); Roeling v. State, 880 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Goddard v. State, 144 S.W.3d 848, 853-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Det. of Ashlock, No. 01-1375, 
2002 WL 31309497, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002). 
 See also Ortega-Mantilla v. State, 898 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that actuarial 
instruments consisted of scientific evidence and therefore must pass the Frye test); Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1117 
(Altenbernd, C.J., concurring) (cautioning that even if actuarial methods passed the Frye test,  “the  current  margin  of  error  
in  these  tests  suggests  that  they  may  be  more  unduly  prejudicial  than  probative”);;   In re Det. of Hargett, 786 N.E.2d 557, 
561-62   (Ill.   App.  Ct.   2003)   (holding   that   a   psychologist’s   testimony   based   on   instruments  measuring   the   respondent’s  
likelihood to re-offend   was   “actuarial   evidence”   that   should   have   been   examined   under   the   Frye test before being 
admitted); Jackson v. State, 833 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing implicitly that actuarial 
instruments were scientific evidence subject to the Frye test for admissibility).  
 See generally People v. Taylor, 782 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Commitment of 
Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004), vacated, 824 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2005), remanded to 830 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005) (chronicling the saga in Illinois after a state court initially concluded that the MNSOST-R and Static-99 tests did not 
satisfy the Frye test for admissibility, and was later instructed by the state supreme court to admit such evidence). 
109  See, e.g., In re Det. of Rudolph, No. 48744-2-I, 2004 WL 1328673, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 14, 
2004); Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 619 (noting that a review of other jurisdictions regarding the admissibility of actuarial 
instruments based on scientific reliability led the court   to  “agree  with  the  recent  conclusion  of   the  New  Jersey  Superior  
Court   that   ‘[o]ur   research   has   revealed   no   state   appellate   court   decision   which   has   found   actuarial   instruments  
inadmissible  at  SVP  proceedings’”  (citation  omitted));;  In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001). 
 Beyond   the   scope   of   this  Article   is   a   discussion   of   the   stark   reality   that   “in  Daubert cases   the  prosecutor’s  
position is sustained (either in support of questioned expertise or in opposition to it) vastly more often than is that of 
defense  counsel’s.”  Michael  L.  Perlin,  “His  Brain  Has  Been  Mismanaged  with  Great  Skill”:  How  Will  Jurors  Respond  to  
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 906-07 (2009). Meanwhile, Professor Susan 
Rozelle  is  more  blunt:  “The  game  of  scientific  evidence  looks  fixed.”  Susan  D.  Rozelle,  Daubert,  Schmaubert: Criminal 
Defendants and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007). 
110  773 A.2d 72, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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these instruments as reliable  and  helpful   sanctioned   the  New  Jersey  court’s  usage.111 By further 
invoking Barefoot v. Estelle,112 to which the R.S. court attributed the allowance of evidence 
regarding future dangerousness based solely on clinical judgment, the R.S. court evaded the 
reliability question.113 Another court, after ruling that neither Daubert nor Frye applied, explained 
that  “where  the  trier  of  fact  is  required  by  statute  to  determine  whether  a  person  is  dangerous  or  
likely to be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available.”114 
In State ex rel. Romley v. Fields,115 an   Arizona   court   held   that   “the   use   of   actuarial  
models  by  mental  health  experts  to  help  predict  a  person’s  likelihood  of  recidivism is not the kind 
of novel scientific evidence or process to which [the Frye test]   applies.”   116 The court further 
noted  that  “unlike  DNA  and  other  types  of  ‘scientific’  evidence,  these  risk assessment tools do not 
have an aura of scientific infallibility . . . . [but are] subject to interpretation and their predictive 
value is  far  less  than  100%.”117 The inconsistency between Daubert and Barefoot on the issue of 
future dangerousness testimony was acknowledged by the court, but ultimately dismissed.118 
Courts have denied SVP committees the opportunity to have a Frye or Daubert hearing 
by employing similar reasoning to that seen in R.S.,119
 
and some have found that the accuracy of 
these tests goes to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility—especially when such 
tools   are   used   to   form   the   basis   for   a   testifying   expert’s opinion concerning the future 
dangerousness of a sex offender.120
 
Courts have likewise pointed to Barefoot and other cases as 
holding that the question of reliability in actuarial-assessment testimony goes to the weight of the 
                                                                
111  Id. at 96-97. 
112  463 U.S. 880 (1983), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, on unrelated grounds as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 
(2000).  
113  In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 90 (concluding that since Barefoot accepted reliability of clinical judgment as to 
future dangerousness, clinical judgment bolstered by actuarial evidence must also be admissible). 
114  People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Ct. App. 1999). 
115  35 P.3d 82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
116  Id. at 89. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 88-89 (observing inconsistency between Barefoot and Daubert/Kumho, but finding actuarial 
evidence admissible on other grounds). 
119  In re R.S., 801 A.2d 219, 221 (N.J. 2002) (affirming, while relying upon the analysis of the state 
appellate   court,   that   “actuarial   risk   assessment   instruments   may   be   admissible   in   evidence   in   a   civil   commitment  
proceeding under the SVPA when such tools are used in the formation of the basis for a testifying   expert’s   opinion  
concerning  the  future  dangerousness  of  a  sex  offender”).  See Thorell, 72  P.3d  at  725  (noting  that  the  court’s  “conclusion  is  
similar  to  that  of  other  jurisdictions,  which  have  upheld  the  use  of  actuarial  assessments,”  before  explicitly referencing the 
New Jersey holdings); Romley, 35 P.3d at 87 (agreeing with other jurisdictions in holding Frye inapplicable to predictions 
of future dangerousness based upon actuarial instruments). Cf. In re C.A., 679 A.2d at 1170-71 (making no mention of 
analyzing an actuarial instrument under a Frye or Daubert test). 
120  E.g. Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 619 (relying in part on the logic from R.S., the court held that determining the 
relevance of   actuarial   tests   implicated   “the   weight   [that]   the   evidence   should   receive   as   opposed   to   the   issue   of  
admissibility”).   See also Hamilton, supra note 104, at 735 (“[R]elatively   few   courts   considering   the   admissibility   of  
RRASOR or Static-99 have conducted any type of reliability analysis, whether Daubert, Frye,  or  a  variant  thereof.”).   
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evidence instead of to admissibility,121
 
and courts have relied on precedent that future 
dangerousness—regarded as medical testimony—does not constitute scientific evidence for 
purposes of Frye.122 Only where recidivism risk was not at issue, was the Static-99   “not  
scientifically  accepted” for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  requisite  “mental  abnormality”  under  
the  state’s  civil  commitment  statute.123 
One California court explained how Frye is inapplicable to medical testimony: 
[This court has] never applied the . . . Frye rule to expert medical testimony, 
even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as 
the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of future 
dangerousness, or even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illness not 
listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association . . . . 124 
A defendant facing civil commitment in the state of Washington moved to exclude 
evidence regarding the results of certain actuarial risk-assessment instruments, including the 
Violence Risk Assessment Guide and the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool.125 A 
Washington appellate court concluded that the actuarial instruments were generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community, based on (1) the expert testimony of both the State and 
the defendant; (2) the scientific literature; and (3) secondary legal authority.126 The Washington 
Supreme Court confirmed in a subsequent sexual predator commitment review that the use of 
these instruments as an aid to expert opinion testimony goes to the weight of the evidence rather 
than to admissibility.127 In rendering its decision to admit such testimony without an additional 
Frye hearing, the court agreed with the authors of an amicus brief that such tools further 
legitimize the assessment of future  risk  by  “anchor[ing]  their  risk  assessments.”128 
                                                                
121  See, e.g., In re Girard, 257 P.3d at 1259; In re Det. of Hauge, 812 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); 
Thorell, 72 P.3d at 725; People v. Litmon, No. H021538, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8195, at *56-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 26, 2002). 
122  The courts in the following cases held that the use of actuarial instruments by expert witnesses to help 
predict   a   sex   offender’s   likelihood   of   recidivism   in   a   civil   commitment   proceeding   is   not   the   kind   of   novel scientific 
evidence or process to which the Frye test applies: In re Girard, 257 P.3d at 1259; In re Det. of Hauge, 812 N.E.2d 571, 
573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); People v. Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); In re Commitment of Lalor, 
661 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Jackson v. State, 833 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding 
that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  by  determining  that  the  actuarial  instruments  used  in  that  case  were  “generally  accepted  in  
the relevant scientific  community  as  part  of  the  overall  risk  assessment  for  sexual  predators”);;  Romley, 35 P.3d at 88-89; 
In re Det. of Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025-26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 238 
(2000), rev’d   on   other   grounds sub nom. Cooley v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (2002) (holding that 
psychiatrist’s  prediction  of  future  dangerousness  is  not  subject  to  Frye, regardless of whether the psychiatrist used clinical 
or actuarial models); Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 207-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
123  E.g., State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 397 (Sup. Ct. 2009). See also In re Commitment of J.P., 772 
A.2d 54, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding actuarial test invalid as applied to juveniles). 
124  Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 419 (citations omitted). 
125  Strauss, 20 P.3d at 1024. 
126  Id. at 1025. 
127  Thorell, 72 P.3d at 725. 
128  Id. (citing the brief of the Washington Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as amicus 
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Based  on   the   Illinois  Supreme  Court   holding   that   “the  Frye standard does not demand 
unanimity,   consensus,   or   even   a   majority   to   satisfy   the   general   acceptance   test,”129 an Illinois 
appellate court determined that   no   error   occurred   by   denying   a   defendant’s   motion   for   a   Frye 
hearing in a sex offender civil commitment case.130 A Florida court declined to resolve the issues 
of whether the actuarial instruments used in sexually violent predator commitment evaluations are 
subject to a Frye analysis or whether they meet the Frye test, because any error in the admission 
of the actuarial evidence was deemed harmless—since   the   experts   relied   on   Appellant’s  
admissions and performed clinical reviews in addition to using actuarial instruments.131 Also 
significant   in   the   court’s   decision  was   that   the   appellant,   rather   than   the   State,   emphasized   the  
results of the actuarial instruments in closing arguments.132 
Evidentiary hearing requests have typically been granted only when a new or relatively 
unknown actuarial tool is introduced.133 For example, an Illinois appellate court remanded a case 
and directed the trial court to conduct a Frye hearing to determine the admissibility of certain 
actuarial instruments used to measure the likelihood of re-offense.134 The court stated that if the 
Static-99, the MnSOST-R, and the RRASOR satisfied the standard set forth in Frye, then the 
judgment of the trial court would be affirmed, but if the tests had not gained general acceptance 
from the psychological and psychiatric communities, the respondent would be entitled to a new 
trial.135 Before the Frye hearing was conducted, the Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion in In 
re Commitment of Simons136 and  noted  that  “in  several  jurisdictions[,]  actuarial  risk  assessment  is  
mandated  by  either  statute  or   regulation.”137 Thus, the appellate court’s  prior  order  was  vacated  
based on criteria laid out in Simons.138 In   responding   to   the   state   supreme   court’s   remand, the 
appellate court noted: 
(1) [E]xperts in at least 19 other states rely upon actuarial risk assessment in 
forming  their  opinions  on  sex  offenders’  risks  of  recidivism;;  (2)  no  state  outside  
of Illinois has deemed inadmissible expert testimony based upon such 
instruments; (3) several jurisdictions actually mandate actuarial risk assessment; 
and (4) academic literature contains many articles confirming the general 
                                                                
curiae). 
129  Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 330 (Ill. 2002), abrogated on other grounds as 
stated in In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 2004). 
130  In re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
131  McQueen v. State, 848 So. 2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
132  Id. at 1220-21. 
133  See, e.g., Det. of Ritter v. State, 312 P.3d 723, 725 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (remanding the case to the 
trial court with directions to conduct a Frye hearing and issue factual findings on the SRA-FV actuarial tool). 
134  In re Det. of Traynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d 949, 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
135  Id. See In re Det. of Traynoff, 831 N.E.2d 709, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (describing the procedural 
posture of the earlier proceedings). 
136  821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004). 
137  Id. at 1194. 
138  Traynoff, 831 N.E.2d at 723. 
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acceptance of actuarial risk assessment by professionals who assess sexually 
violent offenders for risk of recidivism.139 
Here, the conclusion that actuarial risk assessment has gained general acceptance in the 
psychological and psychiatric communities was believed to be thoroughly supported by the case 
law, the statutory law, and the academic literature.140 
Similarly, a federal district court in Massachusetts summarily admitted actuarial 
predictions, concluding the standards of general acceptance and peer review had been met.141 
Meanwhile, an Iowa appellate court affirmed the notion that trial courts may, in their discretion, 
consider the Daubert factors  if  deemed  helpful  in  a  particular  case  because  “[d]eterminations  of  
admissibility of such evidence must necessarily be made on an ad hoc basis, . . . and it would be 
impossible   to   establish   rules   binding   in   every   case.”142 Citing the Iowa Supreme Court, the 
appellate   court   echoed   the   concerning   yet   realistic   point   that   “there   is   no   requirement   that   the  
expert be able to express an opinion with absolute  certainty.”143 
We believe that summary reliance on actuarial tools is error because such tools are still 
premised on questionable and unconfirmed scientific methods.144 The severe consequence 
resulting from these courts’   decisions—blindly allowing for testimony based on actuarial 
findings—is the potential  lifetime  deprivation  of  an  individual’s  liberty.  Therefore,  relying  on  less  
than  “absolute  certainty”  is  difficult  to  accept. 
2. Legal and Judicial Unfamiliarity 
Another concern is the potential for judges and lawyers to blindly accept testimony 
regarding the accuracy of actuarial instruments.145 As   one   state   court   observes,   “[w]e   have  
embarked on the first steps into a new world, arguably a science fiction world, in which judges 
and juries are asked to prevent  crimes  years  before  they  occur.”146 For a judge to make a ruling on 
                                                                
139  Id. (citing Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004)). 
140  Id. at 724. 
141  United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 649 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(“As   is   the  commonly accepted practice in the field, all three experts in this case used an actuarial tool as part of his 
evaluation  process.”). 
142  Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 616 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
143  Id. at 615 (quoting Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Iowa 1997)).  
144  See Cailey S. Miller et al., Reliability of Risk Assessment Measures Used in Sexually Violent Predator 
Proceedings, 24 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 944, 951 (2012). 
145  See, e.g., People v. Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 440-41 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that a Rapid Risk 
Assessment (RRASOR) score in the above-average risk category, adjusted with appropriate clinical factors, supported a 
finding that the defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if released). 
 Also worth mentioning here is In re Linehan,  in  which  the  Minnesota  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  defendant’s  
argument   that   the   State’s   expert   improperly   failed   to   use actuarial  methods,   concluding   instead   that   the   State’s   expert  
relied on base rate recidivism statistics and clinical predictions. 557 N.W.2d 171, 189 (Minn. 1996), cert. granted, vacated 
on other grounds sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). The court also noted testimony that enhanced 
accuracy may be achieved by combining actuarial methods with clinical judgment. Id. at 177. 
146  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1120 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
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the potential future risk of an individual, her ultimate decision is purely based on the subjective 
opinion of an expert witness, and is devoid of concrete answers or verifiable scientific 
conclusions. The initial promise of actuarial instruments that would remove the fallibility of the 
human element and offer quantifiable answers regarding risk to re-offend is understandably 
enticing.147 An opinion responding to a challenge to the admission of Static-99 evidence stated 
that   courts  must   “respect   [the]   policy   of   [the]   legislature  with   respect   to   the   trustworthiness   of  
psychiatric  opinion  evidence  in  cases  involving  sexually  dangerous  persons.”148 
In a sex offender registration case in a Massachusetts state court, a Static-99 score 
designating moderate to high risk was used in conjunction with other factors to classify the 
defendant.149 The  defendant’s  expert  was  qualified  to  testify  but  did  not  utilize  the  Static-99 in his 
assessment.150 The issued  opinion  upheld  the  state’s  classification  level,  and  found  that  the  state’s  
expert’s   testimony   included   the   “factors   in   the   so-called Static-99 which provides for a total 
score”151 in determining risk to re-offend, and together with the remainder of the admitted 
evidence,   satisfied   the   Commonwealth’s   burden   of   proof.   The   court   addressed   the   question   of  
whether psychiatrists and psychologists can predict future behavior only by noting that the 
legislature’s   admittance   of   reports   and   testimony   of   qualified   examiners in SVP hearings 
demonstrates that this testimony can be reliable, if sometimes imperfect.152 
Some courts have held that the adversarial protections of cross-examination and rebuttal 
witnesses would sufficiently allow the defendant the opportunity to challenge actuarial 
instruments’   validity.153 This, of course, is only effective if the defendant is afforded an 
opportunity for a rebuttal witness, and has been assigned effective counsel who is knowledgeable 
and able to dispute opposing expert witness testimony.154 
In another instance, an order jointly issued by two Florida trial court judges declared that 
the actuarial tests were “accepted  by  a  clear  majority  of  the  professional  community  in  assessing  
the   risks   of   recidivism   for   sexually   violent   offenders,” without a thorough discussion of the 
                                                                
147  See, e.g., People v. Santos,  No.  3747/84,  901  N.Y.S.2d  909,  at  *5  (N.Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Oct.  6,  2009)  (“The  use  
of ARAs in predicting sex offender recidivism was an outgrowth of what were seen as the predictive deficiencies of using 
subjective  clinical  judgment  alone.”). 
148  Commonwealth v. Parks, No. 04709, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 225, at *12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 
2005) (citing Commonwealth v. McGruder, 205 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Mass. 1965)). 
149  Parks, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 225, at *5. 
150  Id. at *5-6. 
151  Id. at *9-10. 
152  Id. at *12 (“Judgment   must   be   respected   absent   a   showing   that   it   is   utterly   without   a   reasonable  
foundation  or  specifically  contravenes  a  Constitutional  provision.”  (citation  omitted)). 
153  See, e.g., In re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). See also Halleck v. Coastal Bldg. 
Maint.  Co.,  647  N.E.2d  618,  627   (Ill.  App.  Ct.  1995)   (citation  omitted)   (“On  cross-examination, counsel may probe an 
expert  witness’  qualifications,  experience  and  sincerity,  the  weaknesses  in  the  basis  of  his  opinions,  the  sufficiency  of  his  
assumptions,  and  the  general  soundness  of  his  opinion.”). 
154  This issue was explored in In re Linehan, an early case involving an individual committed under 
Minnesota’s  SVP  law,  in  which  the  defendant,  represented  by  competent  counsel,  challenged  his  commitment  because  the  
state’s   expert   had   failed   to   use actuarial methods in his risk assessment. See 557 N.W.2d at 189. The defendant 
unsuccessfully  argued  that  by  failing  to  perform  actuarial  analysis,  the  state  had  ignored  “state  of  the  art”  evidence  and  the 
“best  available  scientific  knowledge  and  methodology.”  Id. The case was later vacated on other grounds sub nom. Linehan 
v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). 
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various tests or a basis for their opinion.155 At   trial,   neither   party   objected   to   the   judges’  
description  of  the  “relevant  scientific  community,” even though none  of  the  State’s  experts  could  
testify about acceptance within the psychiatric community.156 On appeal from this case to 
Florida’s  appellate  court,  then-Chief Judge Altenbernd wrote a remarkably thoughtful concurring 
opinion, specifically discussing the issues related to reliance on unfamiliar actuarial instruments: 
 I am inclined to believe, however, that the lawyers and trial judges 
involved in these cases have not yet identified the issues that need to be 
examined to determine whether these actuarial tests pass the Frye test and 
whether evidence regarding the tests is more probative than prejudicial. It is not 
entirely clear to me that the diagnostic method utilized by these experts is 
generally accepted within the psychiatric and psychological professions, or that 
the courts should permit opinion testimony based on these methodologies.157 
Subsequently, he highlighted the difficulties in assessing future risk and questioned 
whether  “humans  have  the  ability  to  accurately  select  those  people  who,  by  clear  and  convincing  
evidence, are likely to engage in future acts of sexual  violence   if  not  confined.”158 He carefully 
cautioned that the creation of certain testing instruments were fueled by outside pressures placed 
on psychiatrists and psychologists to develop a scientific method to uniformly identify dangerous 
sex offenders,159 and  clearly  noted  that  although  he  did  “not  profess  to  have  the  expertise  to  even  
phrase all of the questions . . . the judiciary needs to obtain the help of those who can ask and 
answer   the   necessary   questions”   before   testimony   is   admitted   based   on   these actuarial 
instruments.160 
The opinion rendered by the appeals court in the New Jersey case of In re Commitment 
of R.S.161 lacked the well-reasoned and insightful position offered above, and instead argued that: 
Since expert testimony concerning future dangerousness based on clinical 
judgment alone has been found sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence 
at criminal trials[, it is] . . . logical that testimony based upon a combination of 
clinical judgment and actuarial instruments is also reliable. Not only does 
                                                                
155  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1118 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
156  Id. at 1118. 
157  Id. at 1115. 
158  Id. at 1116. 
159  Id. at  1118  (“I  find  it  very  hard  to  believe  that  the  membership  of  the  American  Psychiatric  Association  
and the membership of the American Psychological Association have reached a consensus that their professions can 
achieve these predictions with a level  of  accuracy  sufficient  to  permit  the  indefinite  confinement  of  an  individual.”);;   see 
also Roeling v. State, 880  So.  2d  1234,  1239  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2004)  (defining  the  “relevant  scientific  community”  that  
generally accepts these actuarial tests as “licensed   clinical   psychologists   specializing   in   forensic   psychology   and   the  
evaluation  of  sexually  violent  predators”). 
160  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1118 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
161  773 A.2d 72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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actuarial evidence provide the court with additional relevant information, in the 
view of some, it may even provide a more reliable prediction of recidivism.162 
An  Illinois  appellate  court  similarly  concluded  that  there  existed  “no  logical  reason why 
a professional could not at least consider actuarial instruments, which the profession widely uses 
and  which  are  less  subjective  than  unaided  clinical  judgment.”163 
The   problem   with   this   reasoning   lies   in   the   understanding   of   what   is   “logical.”164 
Although logical reasoning is based on earlier or otherwise known statements, events, or 
conditions,   in   law,   if   those  “known”  statements,  events,  or  conditions  are   incorrect  or   false,   the  
logical deduction stemming from those bases is also false.165 Philosophically speaking, logic is 
characterized by clear or valid reasoning that cannot be accomplished without investigation into 
the basic truths that premise the resulting conclusions.166 This issue is presented in the New Jersey 
case, In re J.P.,167 which illustrates  the  court’s  failure  to  accurately  investigate  and  understand  the  
complexities and uncertainties of actuarial instruments. The defendant in J.P. joined in the R.S. 
appeal, but also raised the issue of the appropriateness of using actuarial instruments to assess the 
future risk of juveniles.168 In R.S., the New Jersey appellate court reaffirmed its confidence in the 
judicial   ability   to   interpret   the   value   and   validity   of   actuarial   instruments,   noting   that   “an  
experienced judge who is well-informed as to the character of the actuarial instruments and who 
is accustomed to dealing with them is much less likely to be prejudiced by their admission . . . 
[and]  accord  the  appropriate  weight  to  actuarial  assessments  in  any  given  case,  or  reject  them.”169 
However, in J.P., the  appellate  court  reversed  the  trial  judge’s  decision  and  remanded  the  case  for  
an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of actuarial instruments to juvenile offenders,170 
because the trial judge had admitted and relied upon expert testimony utilizing actuarial 
instruments without hearing any evidence on the valid use of such tools on individuals who 
committed their offenses while under age eighteen.171 The trial judge had adopted, by reference, 
                                                                
162  Id. at 90. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court, noting that: 
   Although there are critics who challenge the validity and predictability of actuarial 
instruments in sex offender assessments, the record expert testimony and scientific literature 
demonstrates that clinicians specializing in sex offender assessments generally support the use of 
actuarial instruments in the overall assessment process even though they do not support reliance on 
the actuarial instruments alone. 
In re R.S., 801 A.2d at 220-221 (citation omitted). 
163  In re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
164  See generally Mary Massaron Ross, A Basis for Legal Reasoning: Logic on Appeal, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 177 (2006). 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  772 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
168  Id. at 55. 
169  773 A.2d at 91. 
170  772 A.2d at 65. The appellate court states in their opinion that they doubt any studies or information 
exists supporting the usage of these tools for juvenile offenders. Id. at 61. 
171  Id. at  64  (“The  only  testimony  concerning  the  application  of  the  instruments  to  juveniles  elicited  from  
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the prior opinion of the trial judge in R.S.—admitting actuarial instruments as clinical tools in 
SVPA commitment hearings—and added her own clarification: 
They are tools, which are used by clinicians in this area of their expertise. There 
is nothing that I have ever said nor have I seen anything said by any legal writer 
that these are anything more than what they purport to be: Actuarial, placing 
people in groups, matters for consideration by clinicians, not binding. I mean, 
it’s  not  like  an  X[-]ray,  and  I  don’t  think  anybody  ever  said it  was.  I  think  it’s  
admissible  for  what  it  is.  And  I’ll  cast  my  vote  with  Judge Freedman on that.  
. . . .  
 And   I’m  not  going   to   repeat   this  exhaustive  multi-page—I  think  he’s  
got sixty pages or more in which he exhaustively goes into the background of 
these various tests. And I believe that these two [actuarial instruments] are 
included. Okay.172 
Confidence in judicial ability cannot be blindly accepted, and even those judges who 
“have   seen   it   all”   should   support   their   decisions   with   clear   and   valid   reasoning   and   be   held  
accountable for failing to do proper investigation of the basis underlying their decisions. It is up to 
effective counsel to ask the necessary questions and request adequate judicial consideration into 
the propriety of using actuarial tools to evaluate criminal defendants accused of sexually violent 
crimes. 
In In re Williams, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the appellate 
court, which had overturned a district court finding that the defendant, Mr. Williams, was a 
sexually violent predator.173 The appellate court gave considerable weight to the fact that Mr. 
Williams’s  scores  on  actuarial  testing  did  not  exceed  a  fifty  percent  risk  of  sexual  re-offending.174 
Justice Luckert pointed out that there was no authority supporting a particular method of proof, 
test, or percentage or category of risk.175 Ultimately, however, the Kansas court decided that 
evidence  beyond   the   test   scores,  based   in  part  on   the  evaluating  clinician’s  conclusions  of   risk,  
could convince a rational fact-finder that the defendant was a sexually violent predator.176 Thus, it 
affirmed the finding of the district court for the State, despite the inconclusiveness of the actuarial 
tests.177 
Unfortunately, most courts to date still rely on controverted research178 and reveal that 
                                                                
the  State’s  expert  at  the  R.S. evidentiary  hearing  calls  their  reliability  into  question.”). 
172  Id. at 59. 
173  253 P.3d 327, 328-29 (Kan. 2011). 
174  Id. at 335. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. at 336. 
177  Id. at 338. 
178  For an overview of the discrepancies in risk assessment, see generally Robin J. Wilson et al., Comparing 
Sexual Offenders at the Regional Treatment Centre (Ontario) and the Florida Civil Commitment Center, 57 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 377 (2013); Karen Franklin, Treatment and Risk Among the Most 
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the judiciary has failed to ask the necessary questions or demand the necessary answers from the 
clinical community that would justify civil commitment and the grave deprivation of freedom and 
liberty based on future risk predictions.179 
3. Scientific Reliability: Error Rate and Inherent False Positives 
Actuarial tests are designed to establish or define a small group or sub-population of 
people in which the risk that a member of the group will commit a violent sexual offense is higher 
than in the population as a whole. These tests look at whether the likelihood of a particular 
condition is higher than in the population as a whole, but the pool always contains some people 
who do not have the particular condition, and thus false identification is inevitable.180 A false 
positive occurs when a scientist errs by incorrectly placing a person into a group or category 
based on a scientific test.181 When these tests are utilized in sex offender civil commitment, the 
result   of   a   false   positive   is   indefinite   confinement   in   a   facility   that   “looks very similar to a 
prison.”182 For instance, one court noted that: 
[F]or many purposes, an error rate of 30% or more is quite acceptable. Life 
insurance companies, for example, usually charge higher premiums or refuse to 
insure the pool of obese, cigarette smokers because the probability of a 
premature death is higher among the members of this pool, even though many 
members of the pool live to an average age. It is one thing to price insurance 
based on actuarial device with an error rate of 20% or higher; it is quite another 
                                                                
Dangerous Sexual Offenders, IN THE NEWS: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY-LAW (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2012/02/treatment-and-risk-among-most-dangerous.html (discussing 
Wilson   et   al.’s   article). See also Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Alice in Actuarial-Land: Through the Looking Glass of 
Changing Static-99 Norms, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 400 (2010); R. Karl Hanson, Who is Dangerous and When 
are They Safe? Risk Assessment with Sexual Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, & THERAPY 63, 63-72 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond, eds. 2003); In re Registrant G.B., 
685 A.2d 1252 (N.J. 1996); In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153. 
179  See, for example, Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440, in which the court found that a RRASOR score of four, 
adjusted with appropriate clinical factors, supported a finding that the defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent 
behavior if released. See also People v. Otto, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), aff’d  on  other  grounds, 26 
P.3d 1061 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that a defendant is more likely than not to re-offend, based in part on an expert witness 
who used results of RRASOR, along with other clinical factors in evidence at an SVP trial).  
 In Garcetti v. Superior Court, the court held that the Static-99,   “a   psychological   instrument   that   uses   an  
actuarial  method  to  produce  a  profile  of  a  person’s  likelihood of re-offense with an accuracy rate of over 70 percent, and 
that is supplemented or adjusted by use of clinical factors, can form the basis for an expert opinion on future 
dangerousness.”  102  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  at  238-239. 
180  Janus & Prentky, supra note 94 at 1464-65. 
181  Hamilton, supra note 104,  at  749  (noting  that  a  common  problem  is  “improper  interpretation  that  group-
based scores provide risk-assessment estimates   that   are   individualized   to   specific   defendants”).   See, e.g., Rosado, 889 
N.Y.S.2d at 379-380  (“Actuarial  instruments  do  not  measure  psychological  constructs  such  as  personality  or  intelligence.  
In fact, they do not measure any personal attributes of the particular sex offender at all. Rather, they are simply actuarial 
tables—methods  of  organizing  and  interpreting  historical  data.”  (quoting  In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 92)). 
182  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1120 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
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to deprive citizens of their constitutional liberty based on actuarial devices with 
such high error rates.183 
However, courts continue to use actuarial tests in sex offender civil commitment cases. 
For example, one court opinion incorrectly interpreted the results of the Static-99 and noted that it 
“calculated   defendant’s   risk   of   re-offense.”184 In another case, an expert testified that the 
defendant’s   score   of   seven   on   Static-99   “means   that   the   likelihood   of   [the   defendant]   being  
convicted of a new sex offense is 39% within five years of being released . . . .”185 Experts have 
also mischaracterized the use of multiple actuarial tools when such tools are relatively consistent 
in the direction of their risk predictions, presuming that similar results from numerous tools 
strengthen the reliability of each individual tool.186 The known margin of error of the Static-99 
has   even   been   relied   upon   to   undermine   an   expert’s   diagnosis   of   a   defendant   using   the   Static-
99.187 
The New Jersey case of In re R.S. reflects the dissension amongst experts in the 
reliability and accuracy of actuarial assessment tools.188 In  that  case,  the  State’s  experts  testified  
in   favor   of   the   use   of   actuarial   instruments   alluding   to   “an   ‘overwhelmingly’   large   number   of  
research studies [that] support the use of static factors over the use of dynamic factors for making 
sex  offender  risk  determinations,”189 even though all the experts admitted that none of the studies 
had been peer-reviewed.190 The experts for the defense found the instruments to be generally 
unreliable in assessing risk. One expert noted that psychologists have a history of utilizing invalid 
instruments, and that actuarial tools are lacking in 
psychometric reliability (If the test is administered to the same person on more 
than one occasion, are the results consistent?), inter-rater reliability (If two 
different individuals administer the test, are the same results achieved?), and 
                                                                
183  Id. at 1119. 
184  People v. Hubbart, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 498 (Ct. App. 2001). 
185  State v. P.H., 874 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
186  See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 549, 552-53 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Edmonton, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 836, 838-39 (Ct. App. 2002). 
187  See People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 688 n.23, 689 (Ct. App. 2008), aff’d  in  part,  rev’d  in  part  on  
other grounds, 223 P.3d 566 (Cal.  2010)  (relying  on  expert’s  belief  that  defendant  would  re-offend even though the expert 
observed   that   the   defendant’s   Static-99 score was lower than other SVPs, and concluded that he was not diagnosed 
properly). 
188  Hamilton, supra note 104, at 752-753 (noting discrepancies in the scoring of defendants, both between 
experts on competing sides and between two or more experts on the same side, which courts have generally treated as 
issues  of  fact  that  are  not  impacted  by  the  courts’  reliance  on  these  instruments  and  their  scoring  rules). 
189  In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 79. The argument as to interpretation of risk fell upon semantics, with one of the 
State’s  experts  acknowledging  that  it  “is  a  misuse  of  the  instruments  to  say  that  a  person  with  a  certain  score  has  a  specific 
risk of recidivism. Rather, it is proper to say that a person with a certain score is in a group that has been shown through 
research  to  have  a  specific  risk  of  recidivism.”  Id. at 81. 
190  Id. at 79. 
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scale consistency[.] (Are the items on the same scale internally consistent? Do 
they measure the same thing?).191 
The New Jersey appellate court concluded that authoritative scientific and legal writings, 
along with the existence of numerous workshops held nationwide on the subject of risk 
assessment, established that actuarial instruments were “an   accepted   and   advancing   method   of  
helping   to   assess   the   risk   of   recidivism   among   sex   offenders.”192 As the Appellate Division 
summarized: 
The extensive expert testimony in this matter concerning validation studies, 
cross-validation studies, reliability studies, correlation coefficients, and 
clinically-derived factors attests to reliability in this context, where the 
actuarials [sic] are not used as the sole or free-standing determinants for civil 
commitment. They are not litmus tests. There is no requirement that the 
actuarial instruments be the best methods which could ever be devised to 
determine risk of recidivism. What is required is that they produce results which 
are reasonably reliable for their intended purpose.193 
The results from these actuarial tests tend to be used by courts to bolster the opinion that 
the individual is dangerous and should be indefinitely committed,194 which begs the crucial 
question not often asked or answered: what is their intended purpose? 
4. Jury Taint 
Concern over jury confusion has elicited a number of objections to the usage of actuarial 
instruments to determine risk in sexual offender civil commitment cases, although these 
objections have occasionally been struck down.195 In two cases, however, courts have excluded 
such expert  testimony,  one  after  finding  that  “the  Static-99 does not distinguish between, nor can 
it explain, the reasons why a person might re-offend,”196 and another after finding testimony 
                                                                
191  Id. at 81. 
192  Id. at 95. 
193  Id. at 91. 
194  See Hamilton, supra note 104,  at  750  (“While  courts  have  tended  to  accept  the  individualized  statistic  
when the actuarial-based risk estimate is high, they have tended to highlight the group-based nature of actuarial scores 
when   the   results   are   low.”),   citing   In re Civil Commitment of K.S., No. SVP-344-03, 2008 WL 631284, at *3-4 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2008)  (noting  “high  risk”  score  on  Static-99 as part of determination that commitment was 
proper); State v. Vanek, No. 89125, 2007 WL 4126660, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007) (finding for state despite low 
score  while  noting  that  “the  utility  of  the  Static-99 evaluation as a diagnostic tool for individual risk assessment is open to 
question”  (citation  omitted));;  State  v.  Ellison,  No.  78256,  2002  WL  1821927,  at  *2,  7  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  2002)  (holding  that  
court need not give much weight to Static-99 evidence showing  defendant   to  be  “low-to-medium  risk,”   since  actuarial-
based  risk  estimates  could  “be  at  odds  with  Ohio’s  statutory  scheme”  requiring  individualized  determinations). 
195  See, e.g., Ward, 83 Cal.  Rptr.  2d  at  831  (“Frye applies to cases involving novel devices or processes, not 
to  expert  medical  testimony,  such  as  a  psychiatrist’s  prediction  of  future  dangerousness  or  a  diagnosis  of  mental  illness.”). 
196  State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 391-92 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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based on the SVR-20 test inadmissible under Frye.197 In People v. Santos,198 a New York court 
opined that risk assessment   “is   a   dynamic   and   ever   changing   discipline,   where   new   research  
findings   continually   modify   the   understanding   of   risk.”199 The court focused on the recent 
revision of the Static-99,   “the   most   common   ARA   in   use   throughout the world today,”200 to 
exemplify the changing opinions on risk, and notably the fact that recidivism rates for sex 
offenders are significantly lower than when the original norms were compiled in 2003.201 
In 2002, Iowa faced its first appellate challenge to the admissibility of expert testimony 
regarding actuarial risk assessment instruments.202 The appellate court admitted testimony based 
on the scoring of actuarial instruments—including the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender 
Recidivism   (“RRASOR”),   the Static-99, the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tools 
(“MnSOST”),  and  the  Minnesota  Sex  Offender  Screening  Tools-Revised  (“MnSOST-R”)—some 
of which had only been in existence for two to three years.203 The  court  stated   that   the  expert’s  
reliance on these instruments was appropriate since the expert had also conducted a full clinical 
evaluation, including thorough review of a comprehensive file of materials and documents 
relating   to   the   defendant’s past criminal history.204 The   defendant’s   expert,   arguing   against 
actuarial instruments, told the district court that although it is acceptable to perform the tests: 
 What’s  not  accepted  at  this  point  in  time  is  adding  up  those  numbers  to  
get some kind of a score that you can then change into a prediction of the future. 
That’s  where  the  science  doesn’t  support  things.  So  having  a  list  of bad signs, 
that’s  perfectly  acceptable.  Changing  them  into  a  number  to  predict  the  future,  
there’s   no   basis   for   that.   And   if   one   wants   to   use   the   tests, one has to 
acknowledge that there is no foundation for that.205 
Disregarding the cautionary testimony on the usage of these instruments, the trial court 
found  the  instruments  to  be  reliable,  and  the  judge  was  confident  that  the  jury  would  not  be  “left  
with a mistaken assumption that [the testimony of the actuarial instruments would be] . . . all they 
need  to  look  at.”206 
The   Iowa  appellate  court  affirmed   the   lower  court’s  decision.207 The court rejected the 
argument that cross-examination on the statistical and methodological problems associated with 
                                                                
197  Collier v. State, 857 So. 2d 943, 945-946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
198  901 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
199  Id. at *9. 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  See In re Det. of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). 
203  Id. at 617. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 618. 
206  Id. at 619; see also Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 583-84 (recounting how  a  psychologist,  the  state’s  expert  
in a jury trial, based his opinion—that the defendant was more likely than not to re-offend—on the results of the Static-
99). 
207  Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 620. 
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actuarial instruments would confuse and mislead the jury.208 Further, the court cited to the then-
recent conclusion of the New Jersey Superior Court209 that  “[o]ur  research  has  revealed  no  state  
appellate court decision which has found actuarial instruments inadmissible at SVP 
proceedings.”210 
One individual facing civil commitment argued before the court that Static-99 may 
confuse a jury because the actuarial instrument211 only predicts group risk, which cannot always 
be accurately applied to individual risk.212 At least one court has found that results of the Static-99 
were admissible as testimony in cases involving the civil commitment of a sexually violent 
predator so long as the instrument was used in conjunction with a full clinical evaluation.213 
As explained in People v. McDonald214: 
When a witness gives his personal opinion on the stand—even if he qualifies as 
an expert—the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with a 
healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible. 
But the opposite may be true when the evidence is produced by a machine: like 
many laypersons, jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty 
to   proof   derived   from   an   apparently   “scientific”   mechanism,   instrument,   or  
procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility that often surrounds such evidence may 
well conceal the fact that it remains experimental and tentative. For this reason, 
courts have invoked the Kelly-Frye rule primarily in cases involving novel 
devices or processes such as lie detectors,   “truth   serum,”   Nalline   testing,  
                                                                
208  Id. at 619-20  (“[The  instruments’]  limitations  were  clearly  made  known  to  the  jury.”). 
209  In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 96. 
210  Id. at 619 (quoting In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 96). In footnote 5 of the Holtz opinion, the Iowa court also 
cited a number of cases in which evidence based on actuarial instruments had been admitted, including Strauss, 20 P.3d at 
1026 (upholding use of MnSOST, RRASOR and VRAG); Garcetti, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241 (allowing use of PCL-R, 
RRASOR and Static-99); In re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 998, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (upholding use of 
RRASOR); Campbell, 986 P.2d at 779 (upholding use of actuarial instruments and noting that proper weight of evidence 
is question for jury); Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (upholding use of RRASOR); Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832  (“In  civil  
commitment cases, where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is dangerous or likely to be 
dangerous,  expert  prediction  may  be  the  only  evidence  available.”).   
 See also Romley,  35  P.3d  at  89  (concluding  that  the  “use  of  actuarial  models  by  mental health experts to help 
predict  person’s  likelihood  of  recidivism  is  not  the  kind  of  novel  scientific  evidence  or  process  to  which  Frye applies”);;  
Commonwealth v. Reese, No. CIV.A 00-0181-B,  2001  WL  359954,  at  *9  (Mass.  Super.  Ct.  2001)  (noting  that  “statistics, 
in   general,   are   better   predictors   of   future   sexual   dangerousness   than   clinical   judgments”),   vacated, 781 N.E.2d 1225 
(Mass. 2003). 
 Many of the aforementioned cases within this footnote are cited in Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 619 n.5. 
211  Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: A Survey of 
Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 425, 427-28 (2007). 
212  Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 587. 
213  See In re Care and Treatment of Murrell, 215 S.W.3d 96, 112 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (acknowledging an 
argument that actuarial instruments  should  be  rejected  as  “irrelevant”  because  “they  are  a  product  of  the  recidivism  of  the  
test  group,  not  the  individual  being  evaluated”). 
214  690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 
(Cal. 2000). 
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experimental systems of blood typing,   “voiceprints,”   identification   by   human  
bite marks, microscopic analysis of gunshot residue, and hypnosis and, most 
recently,   proof   of   guilt   by   “rape   trauma   syndrome.”   In   some   instances the 
evidence passed the Kelly-Frye test,  in  others  it  failed;;  but  in  all  such  cases  “the  
rule serves its salutary purpose of preventing the jury from being misled by 
unproven and ultimately  unsound  scientific  methods.”215 
How competent is a jury to accurately discern testimony about the results of the Static-99 
test? In a 2003 case, California presented the testimony of two psychologists who performed the 
Static-99 test during their evaluations.216 The first expert found that the Static-99 test indicated a 
fifty-two percent chance that defendant would re-offend within fifteen years.217 The second 
psychologist testified that she used the Static-99   test   to   get   a   “general   thumbnail   estimate   of  
where   [she]   thought   [defendant]   would   fall,”   but   did   not   rely   on the test.218 One psychologist 
admitted that the developer of the Static-99 continually revises the instrument; thus, it was not 
perfect and no study had shown that adjusting the actuarial risk assessment would produce a more 
accurate measure of risk.219 The expert also explained that psychologists do not have actuarial 
instruments that encompass all the known risk factors obtained from research on re-offenders.220 
The   defendant’s   psychologist   testified   that   “the   Static-99 test is a work-in-progress and its 
reliability is unknown. . . . [T]he factors considered in the Static-99 test are important and must be 
considered, but [the expert] objected to using the assessment as an arithmetic personality 
profile.”221 He  pronounced  that  defendant’s  behavior  was  “opportunistic, not predatory, and that 
defendant had control  over  his  behavior.”222 Both state experts found that the defendant posed a 
substantial risk of re-offense.223 
The California appellate court upheld the commitment based on the information that the 
state’s   experts relied on other factors outside of the actuarial instruments to make their 
assessment, and held that the lower court had adequately informed the jury that the procedures 
used in the Static-99 were objective and fallible.224 The court felt confident in its assumption that 
no reasonable juror would mistake either expert’s  use  of  the  Static-99 test as a source of infallible 
truth on the issue of defendant’s   risk   of   re-offending.225 Of course, where there is a dispute 
                                                                
215  Id. at 724 (citations omitted). 
216  People v. Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 419 (Ct. App. 2003). 
217  Id. at 417. 
218  Id. at 418. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. at 417. 
221  Id. at 418. 
222  Id. at 419. 
223  Id. at 417-18. 
224  Id. at 420 (“No  precise  legal  rules  dictate  the  proper  basis  for  an  expert’s  journey  into  a  patient’s  mind  to  
make judgments about his behavior. Psychological evaluation is a learned professional art, rather than the purported exact 
‘science’   with   which   Kelly/Frye is   concerned.”   (citing   People   v.   Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989) (internal citations 
omitted))). 
225  Id. at  418  (stating  that  “no  reasonable  juror  would  mistake  expert’s  reliance  on  standardized  tests  such  as  
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between clinicians, the fact-finder is left with a simple credibility judgment, in which the fear of 
sexual violence creates a strong bias in favor of assessments that are more protective of public 
safety.226 This becomes especially problematic in light of valid and reliable evidence that juries 
are “more  likely  to  undervalue,  rather  than  overvalue,  statistical  evidence.”227 
In the New Jersey case of R.S., the trial judge acknowledged that unreliable 
psychological testimony might mislead a jury but concluded that, where the court is the trier of 
fact, the risk of confusion from expert testimony is greatly diminished.228 Similarly, a Florida 
judge questioned whether jurors should be called upon to evaluate the validity of these tests when 
deciding   issues  of   liberty,  noting   that   “[w]hen  presented   to  a   jury,   these tests, coupled with the 
testimony of the experts who rely on them, may imply an infallibility not found in pure opinion 
testimony.”229 In a recent experimental study, Professors Nicholas Scurich and Daniel Kraus 
concluded that adjusting actuarial risk with clinical judgment was taken into consideration by 
mock jurors only when it increased the risk estimate, not when it diminished it.230 
Jury   taint   is   most   definitely   compounded   by   a   judge   or   lawyer’s   blind   acceptance   or  
unfamiliarity with the tools and tests.  A  jury’s  susceptibility  to  a  judge’s  confidence  in  actuarial  
tools or a heavily-weighted, one-sided interpretation of  the  tools’  reliability  is  a  valid  concern,  and  
may  seal  a  defendant’s  lifetime  commitment. 
B. Expert Qualifications 
The debate over the necessary expert qualifications required to testify in a sexual 
offender commitment case has been frequently argued.231 One Texas trial court found, after 
conducting a Daubert hearing,   that   the  defendant’s   expert   lacked   the   requisite   forensic   training  
and experience to testify on his behalf.232 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court 
abused its discretion and denied him a fair trial when it excluded the testimony of his only 
expert—despite her documented extensive experience and training in providing sex offender 
treatment—and prevented him from presenting his side of the case to the jury.233 The State 
                                                                
MMPI  as  source  of  infallible  truth  on  personality,  predisposition  or  criminal  guilt”  (citing  Stoll, 783 P.2d 698)). 
226  Janus & Prentky, supra note 94, at 1448. 
227  Id. at 1451 (citing, inter alia, Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors’  Use  of  Probabilistic  Evidence, 20 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 49, 51 (1996)). 
228  In re R.S., 773 A.2d at 85. 
229  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1117 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Flanagan 
v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993)). 
230  Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, The Effect of Adjusted Actuarial Risk Assessment on Mock-
Jurors’   Decisions   in   a   Sexual   Predator   Commitment   Proceeding, 53 JURIMETRICS J, 395 (2013). But see Marcus T. 
Boccaccini et al, Do Scores from Risk Measures Matter to Jurors? 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 260 (2013) 
(“[J]urors  asked  to  make  decisions  in  SVP  cases are more likely to be influenced by testimony based on clinical judgment 
than by testimony based on findings from risk-assessment instruments.”). 
231  Ward,  83  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  at  832  (“Whether  [the  experts]  used  clinical  or  actuarial  models  and  whether  they  
specifically followed the DMH handbook are not reasons to exclude their testimony. Even if a difference of opinion exists 
among  professionals  on  these  matters,  the  experts  were  not  restricted  to  one  methodology  or  another.”). 
232  In re Commitment of Bohannan, 379 S.W.3d 293, 297-298 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
233  Id. at 300. 
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maintained   that   any   error   in   excluding   the   defendant’s   expert   was   harmless,   despite   that   her  
opinion stated that the defendant lacked a behavioral abnormality  “at  this  time.”234 The appellate 
court  overturned  the  trial  court’s  ruling  and  concluded  that  the  defendant’s  expert  was  qualified  to  
testify to the likelihood of re-offense,   “a   critical   issue   disputed   by   the   parties,   and  without   her  
testimony, the jury had only the State’s  experts  to  guide  them  in  determining  one  of  the  critical  
issues  in  the  case.”235 
On subsequent appeal, the Texas Supreme Court issued a number of findings regarding 
the issue of expert qualifications, in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding  the  defendant’s  expert.  First,   it  held  that  “the  [Texas  SVP]  Act  does  not  prescribe  the  
qualifications for experts to testify whether a person has the behavioral abnormality required for 
an SVP . . . [and] in the Legislature’s  view,  an  expert  used  to  assess  whether  a  person  is  an  SVP  is  
not   constitutionally   required   to   be   a   physician.”236 Second,   “credentials   are   important,   but  
credentials alone do not qualify an expert to testify . . . [and] a medical license does not 
automatically  qualify  the  holder  to  testify  as  an  expert  on  every  medical  question.”237 Third,  “trial  
courts must ensure that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual 
subject   about   which   they   are   offering   an   opinion.”238 Specifically,   “[t]he   test   is   whether   the  
offering party has established that the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an 
opinion on that particular subject.”239 Fourth,   “‘opinions   about   behavior . . . and psychology 
depend largely on the subjective interpretation  of  the  expert,’  and  opinions  ‘too  dependent  upon  
[an  expert’s]  subjective  guesswork’  must  be  excluded.”240 “The  expert’s  experience,  knowledge,  
and  training  are  crucial   in  determining  whether  the  expert’s  opinions  are  admissible.”241 Finally, 
the   court   pointed   out   that   “risk   assessments   are   to   a   degree   subjective,   and   in   evaluating   an  
expert’s qualifications to make them, it is important to know what training and experience an 
expert  has  in  minimizing  that  subjectivity.”242 
A final concern stems from the quality and extent of training that is sought and available 
to experts utilizing these tools. The authors of the Static-99 write in their coding rules that they 
“strongly  recommend  training  in  the  use  of  the  Static-99 before attempting risk assessments that 
may   affect   human   lives.”243 In the initial trials involving actuarial instruments, formal training 
manuals for the instruments did not exist. Only articles, technical instructions, varied workshops 
by the instruments developers244 and materials on the Internet245 were available to aid evaluators 
                                                                
234  Id. at 298. 
235  Id. at 300. 
236  In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 299 (Tex. 2012); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2013). 
237  Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d at 304-305. 
238  Id. at 305. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. at 305-06 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
241  Id. at 306. 
242  Id. at 307. 
243  ANDREW HARRIS ET AL., STATIC-99 CODING RULES REVISED 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-rules_e.pdf. 
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in scoring. 
An expert in Illinois scored three actuarial risk assessment instruments after receiving 
about 150 hours of specialized training geared to the proceedings   under   the   state’s   SVP   Act,  
including the administration of actuarial risk assessment instruments and other evaluation tools. 
Based on those scores, the expert placed   the   defendant   in   “membership   with   a   group of sex 
offenders who did sexually re-offend  at  a  fairly  high  rate.”246 
In another instance, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld commitment even though the 
state’s  expert  had  performed  only  seventeen  or  eighteen  prior  sexual  predator  evaluations.247 The 
court reinstated the order of commitment: 
If we were weighing the evidence and assessing credibility, we might reach a 
different result from that of the district court. But that is not our role and should 
not have been the role of the Court of Appeals. Rather, we look at all of the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine if a reasonable 
fact finder would find the State had met its burden. 
 . . . .  
 As is often true in cases such as this, the dispute became a battle of the 
experts.248 
C. Counsel’s  Responsibilities 
These complex issues and circumstances must be considered in evaluating the quality of 
representation afforded to individuals in potential sexual predator commitment cases. These cases 
are truly like no other in the justice system and require a heightened standard of representation. 
To meet this heightened standard, counsel must use every resource and tool at his disposal to be 
effective and offer ethical and rigorous representation. 
Counsel must seek out and have access to expert instruction and opinion on the 
psychiatric, social, and political elements of each case—skills that are most likely beyond most 
attorneys’   schooling   and   legal   education.   Without   such   access,   counsel   has   little   hope   of  
understanding the opinions and expertise that he will confront throughout the development of the 
case, and may be likely to provide inadequate representation. Only through stricter standards of 
representation will we have the ability,   in   the  words  of  a  Florida  appellate  court,   to  “honor  and  
                                                                
244  Hamilton, supra note 104,  at  733  (“There  are  no  criteria,  however,  for  the  scope,  time,  or  regimen  for  
training or otherwise certifying potential assessors on the actuarial instruments.”). 
245  Id.  at  733  (“Mostly,  information  is  vicariously  available  on  the  internet  and  through  occasional  training  
classes.”). 
246  In re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
247  In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 329 (Kan. 2011). 
248  Williams, 253 P.3d at 338. In arguing before the Kansas Supreme Court, the State argued that the Court 
of Appeals focused on the statistical data from the risk assessment tools finding that the percentages of risk, generated by 
the   actuarial   tests,   were   “rather   low   in   comparison to other defendants who have been found to be sexually violent 
predators.”  Id. at 335; the lower court proceedings (which were later reversed) can be found at In re Williams, 2009 WL 
2762455 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). 
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trust  the  heritage  of  freedom  and  liberty  that  has  made  this  country  strong.”249 
 
II. APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS 
A. The Defendant’s Right to an Expert: Ake v. Oklahoma 
Nearly  thirty  years  ago,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  addressed  the  question  of  a  defendant’s  
right to an expert in a criminal trial.250 
In Ake v. Oklahoma,251 a death penalty case, the Supreme Court ruled that an 
indigent criminal defendant who makes a threshold showing that insanity is 
likely to be a significant factor at trial is constitutionally entitled to a 
psychiatrist’s  assistance. The  Court  observed   that   it   had  “long   recognized   that  
when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a 
criminal proceeding, it must take steps to insure that the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to present  his  defense.” This principle, grounded in the due process 
clause’s   guarantee   of   “fundamental   fairness,”   derives   from   the   belief   “that  
justice cannot be equal when, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is 
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in 
which  his  liberty  is  at  stake.”252 
 “Meaningful  access   to   justice”   is   the   theme  of   the   relevant  cases,   the  
Court found, noting  that  “mere  access  to  the  courthouse  doors  does  not  by  itself  
assure a proper functioning   of   the   adversary   process.” A criminal trial is 
“fundamentally   unfair   if   the   State   proceeds   against   an   indigent   defendant  
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense.”253 
. . . .  
. . . [The  Court]   considered   the   “pivotal   role”  psychiatry   has   come   to  play   in  
criminal proceedings, reflecting   the   “reality . . . that when the State has made 
the  defendant’s  mental  condition  relevant  to  his  criminal  culpability  and  to  the 
                                                                
249  Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1121 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
250  One of the authors of this Article, MLP, also discussed this case in Michael L. Perlin,“And   I   See  
Through   Your   Brain”:   Access   to   Experts,   Competency   to   Consent,   and   the   Impact   of   Antipsychotic   Medications   in  
Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2009). This Part contains several 
excerpts from that article, from which citations have been omitted. 
251  470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985). 
252  Perlin, supra note 250 (citations omitted). 
253  Id.; see Perlin, supra note 250,   at   n.49   (“While such a defendant does not have a right to all the 
assistance that a wealthier defendant might be able to purchase, he is nonetheless entitled  to  ‘an  adequate  opportunity  to  
present  [his]  claims  fairly  within  the  adversary  system.’”)  (quoting  Ross  v.  Moffitt,  417  U.S.  600,  612  (1974)). 
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punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial 
to  the  defendant’s  ability  to  marshal  his  defense.”254 
The Court set out what it perceived as the role of the psychiatrist in such cases255: 
 
 [P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional 
examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge 
or jury; they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible 
conclusions about   the  defendant’s  mental  condition,  and  about   the  effects  
of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the 
defendant’s  mental  condition might have affected his behavior at the time 
in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the opposing 
party’s   psychiatrists   and   how   to   interpret   their   answers.   Unlike   lay  
witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be 
relevant   to   the   defendant’s   mental   state, psychiatrists can identify the 
“elusive   and   often   deceptive”   symptoms   of   insanity, . . . and tell the jury 
why their observations are relevant. Further, where permitted by 
evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into 
language that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a 
form that has meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of 
investigation, interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay 
jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a 
sensible and educated determination about the medical condition of the 
defendant at the time of the offense.256 
Importantly, for purposes of the question we are facing here, 
 [t]he courts have generally read Ake narrowly, and have refused to 
require   appointment   of   an   expert   unless   it   is   “absolutely   essential   to   the  
defense.” By way of examples, courts have split on whether there is a right to an 
expert psychologist to perform psychological testing under Ake, and have also, 
without citing Ake, rejected an application for the right to the appointment of a 
social psychologist to aid in jury selection. Ake, on the other hand, was relied on 
so as to require the appointment of a pathologist in a criminal case. On the 
perhaps-closer question of the requirement of the appointment of a DNA expert, 
after an intermediate appellate court in Virginia relied on Ake to require the 
appointment of such an expert, that decision was subsequently vacated, with no 
discussion of Ake in the subsequent opinion.257 
The application of Ake to SVP proceedings remains an open question.258 As the Crane 
                                                                
254  Perlin, supra note 250 (citations omitted). 
255  Id.  
256  Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81 (internal citations omitted)). 
257  Perlin, supra note 250 (citations omitted). 
258  Jules Epstein, Sexually Violent Predators, in 49 PROSECUTION & DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 41-11 (B. 
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court noted,   the   “science   of   psychiatry,   which   informs   but   does   not   control   ultimate   legal  
determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror 
those  of   the   law.”259 It would therefore seem necessary to provide individuals facing SVP civil 
commitment with an absolute right to the appointment of an expert witness. Perhaps courts may 
follow the lead of the pre-Ake case, Little v. Streater,260 which conferred a right to state-funded 
blood testing in paternity actions because of their   “quasi-criminal   status.”261 A Texas appellate 
court, citing Little, ruled  that  “[b]ecause  the  SVP  statute  provides  for  assistance  of  counsel,  due  
process  requires  a  person  to  be  able  to  enjoy  that  protected  right.”262 Without concluding whether 
the SVPA was civil or quasi-criminal,   the  same  court  held   that   the  defendant’s   liberty   interests,  
including the statutory right to counsel, were violated.263 The court distinguished Allen v. Illinois 
because  it   involved  “actual  treatment  in  a  psychiatric hospital.”264 However, the Texas Supreme 
Court reversed the ruling of the appellate court and reiterated that competency hearings are not 
required for civil proceedings,265 noting that by their very nature, civil commitments often involve 
individuals who would be incompetent to stand trial.266 Criminal due process rights would only 
apply if the individual were to violate the terms of his civil commitment by committing a 
felony.267 Although the Texas Supreme Court sidestepped the right-to-counsel   issue,   the  court’s  
decision makes it even more necessary to have legislative standards requiring the appointment of 
a qualified mental health expert. 
Without mention of any right to an expert witness, one Florida court found that to 
meaningfully exercise due process rights, a SVPA respondent must be competent so that she may 
both testify on her own behalf and assist counsel in challenging the alleged facts.268 The court 
stressed that any inability to assist counsel in challenging the facts presented at trial violates due 
                                                                
Anthony Morosco ed., 2007).  
259  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 81, for the proposition that 
“psychiatry  [is]  not  ‘an  exact  science’”). 
260  452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
261  Id. at 9-10. 
262  Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 838 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (en banc), rev’d, 164 S.W.3d 
637 (Tex. 2005) (citing Little v. Streater, 452  U.S.  1,  16  (1981))  (“[A]  statute  .  .  .  may  be  held  constitutionally  invalid  as  
applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in 
the legitimate exercise  of  state  power  is  beyond  question.”). 
263  Id. at  838  (“[The  defendant’s]  due  process  rights  were  violated  because  competent  evidence  indicated  
his incapacity both to participate in the proceeding in an effective way and his demonstrated inability to factually or 
rationally  utilize  his  right  to  counsel.”). 
264  Id. at 835-42 (comparing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986)). 
265  In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 654. 
266  Id. at 653-54. 
267  Id. at 654.  
 In 2003, the Texas Legislature revised the SVPA to allow a court to appoint outside counsel for alleged SVPs if 
no representative of the Office of the State Counsel for Offenders is available. 
 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.005(b) (West 2013) (effective Sept. 1, 2003).  
268  In re Commitment of Branch, 890 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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process, and the right is simply illusory.269 
Nevertheless, other courts have come out differently. Although one Pennsylvania 
appellate court found a right to court-funded expert assistance for an SVP defendant,270 and while 
one Florida appellate court has applied Ake in a similar context,271 it appears that only four states 
statutorily provide access to experts in such cases,272 and in at least one of those states, the 
constitutional argument has been rejected.273 California’s   SVPA   expressly   authorizes   the  
appointment of experts for indigent litigants,274 but the state does not have to give an indigent 
defendant a confidential evaluation from a non-testifying expert.275 Citing Ake, one California 
appellate  court  explained,  “there is no right to more than one appointed mental health expert and 
no  right  to  a  favorable  evaluation.”276 This is even more problematic when we recognize that valid 
and reliable research indicates that even mental health clinicians may lack formal training in risk 
assessment, and thus may be unaware of risk assessment research findings.277 
A recent article has considered the application of Ake to   cases   involving   children’s  
deaths—a cohort of cases that would certainly inspire some of the same enmity as is found in 
SVPA cases.278 The   article   has   argued   that,   given   “courts’   ready admission of prosecutorial 
forensic evidence that may be invalid, unreliable, or misleading  and  the  defendant’s  lack  of  a  fair  
opportunity   to   rebut   such   evidence,”279 Ake should apply in such cases. Certainly, identical 
arguments could be made for SVPA cases. 
                                                                
269  Id. (emphasizing  “that  it  is  not  the  admission  of  hearsay  that  thwarts  a  [Florida  SVPA]  respondent’s  due  
process  rights  .  .  .  .  [i]nstead,  it  is  an  incompetent  respondent’s  inability  to  assist  counsel  in  challenging  the  facts  contained 
in those hearsay statements that violates  due  process”). 
270  See Curnutte, 871 A.2d at 842-44. 
271  See Lavender v. State, 889 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
272  See Epstein, supra note 258, § 41.02 (stating that Arizona, California, Kansas, and Washington have 
laws that provide expert assistance to indigent defendants).  
 See also In re Detention of Kortte, which held that (1) if the sex offender who is the subject of proceedings 
under the Illinois SVPA is indigent, he is entitled as matter of due process to the appointment of an expert; (2) if a sex 
offender who is the subject of proceedings under the Illinois SVPA does not submit to an evaluation by an expert from the 
state’s  Department  of Human Services, but the state still calls an examining expert, due process requires that the offender 
be permitted to call an examining expert of his own; and (3) if the state calls only non-examining experts, the sex offender 
must be permitted to call one as well. 738 N.E.2d 983, 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
273  People v. Angulo, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 189, 198, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that statutorily-
authorized expert evaluative reports of defendants may not be privileged). 
274  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §  6603(a)  (West  2014)  (“In  the  case  of  a  person  who  is  indigent,  the  court  
shall appoint counsel to assist him or her, and, upon the person’s   request,   assist   the   person   in   obtaining   an   expert   or  
professional  person  to  perform  an  examination  or  participate  in  the  trial  on  the  person’s  behalf.”). 
275  Angulo, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197. 
276  Id. 
277  Janus & Prentky, supra note 94, at 1495 (citing, inter alia, Eric B. Elbogen et al., Perceived Relevance 
of Factors for Violence Risk Assessment: A Survey of Clinicians, 1 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 37, 44 (2002)). 
278  Laurel Gilbert, Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate Defense: Providing for the Appointment of Experts 
for Indigent Defendants in Child Death Cases under Ake v. Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469, 475 (2013). 
279  Id. 
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B. Despised Populations 
Sex offenders280 are in the media and legal spotlight, and are considered to be the most 
despised segment of the American population.281 Regularly   reviled   as   “monsters”   by   district  
attorneys in jury summations,282 judges at sentencing,283 elected representatives at legislative 
hearings,284 and the media,285 the   demonization   of   sex   offenders   has   helped   create   a   “moral  
panic”286 that has driven the passage of legislation.287 The  “anger  and  hostility  the  public  feels”288 
                                                                
280  On the imprecision and overbreadth of this category, ranging from the stranger pedophiliac rapist to the 
teenager   consensually   “sexting”   pictures of herself to her boyfriend, see Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and 
Practice, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1203,   1208   (1998)   (“[S]ex   offenders   do   not   share   a   common   set   of   psychological   and  
behavioral   characteristics.”).   See also ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (2014) (criminalizing the display of obscene bumper 
stickers  descriptive  of  “sexual  or  excretory  activities”  as  a  misdemeanor).  See generally Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56, at 
21   (discussing   the   current   system   which   “bundles   statutory   rape   cases   that   deal   with   sexual   interactions   between  
teenagers—interactions that would otherwise be consensual but for the age of one of the partners—with cases of 
individuals who have committed   violent   pedophilic   offenses”).   On   the   incoherence   of   laws   governing   adolescent  
sexuality, see generally Michelle Oberman, Two Truths and a Lie: In re John Z. and Other Stories at the Juncture of Teen 
Sex and the Law, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 364 (2013). On juveniles and sex offenses generally, see generally Carissa 
Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law, 46 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 5 
(2013). 
281  Perlin, supra note 31,   at   1248   (“If   we   are   no   longer   focusing   on   insanity   defendants   as   the   most  
‘despised’   group   in   society,   it   is   more   likely   because there   is   a   new   universe   of   ‘monsters’   replacing   them   in   our  
demonology: sex offenders, known variously, as mentally disordered sex offenders, or sexually violent predators, the 
ultimate   ‘other.’”)  See also Eric J. Buske, Sex Offenders Are Different: Extending Graham to Categorically Protect the 
Less Culpable, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 417, 433 (2011). 
282  We have yet to find an appellate reversal of a case in which this inflammatory language was used. See, 
e.g., Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 960 (9th Cir. 2006); Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1999); Jackson 
v. Ludwick, No. 2:09-CV-11928, 2011 WL 4374281, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2011); State v. Henry, 102 So.3d 1016, 
1024 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Bonner v. State, No. 10-09-00120-CR, 2010 WL 3503858, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2010). 
283  See, e.g., People v. Ball, No. 295851, 2011 WL 1086557, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2011). 
284  See, e.g., Timothy E. Wind, The  Quandary  of  Megan’s  Law:  When  the  Child  Sex  Offender  Is  a  Child, 37 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 92 (2003) (quoting Rep. Mark Green); Daniel M. Filler, Making the  Case  for  Megan’s  Law:  A  
Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 339 (2001) (quoting Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison). 
285  See, e.g., Rachel J. Rodriguez, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge:  Has  Megan’s  Law  Run  Amok?, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1031-32 (2010) (quoting John G. Winder, The Monster Next Door: The Plague of American Sex 
Offenders, CYPRESS TIMES,  Nov.  20,  2009  (“‘There’s  no  such  thing  as  monsters.’  We  tell  our  kids  that.  The  truth is that 
monsters  are  real.  .  .  .  These  monsters  are  called  ‘Sex  Offenders’.  .  .  .”)). 
286  See, e.g., Filler, supra note 284; Eric M. Fink, Liars and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic 
and the Symbolic Politics of Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2019, 2038-39 (2008); Eamonn 
Carrabine, Crime, Culture and the Media in a Globalizing World, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
& JUSTICE STUDIES 397, 401 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Heather Y. Bersot, eds., 2014); STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS & 
MORAL PANICS 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
287  On  “legislative  panic”  in  this  context,  see  Wayne  A.  Logan,  Megan’s  Laws  as  a  Case  Study  in  Political  
Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 371, 371 (2011); Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1317,   1320   (1998).   On   “judicial   panic”   in   the   context   of   same-sex marriage cases, see John G. Culhane, 
Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1146 (1999). 
288  Meghan Gilligan, Note, It’s  Not  Popular  But  It  Sure  Is  Right:  The  (In)Admissibility  of  Statements  Made  
Pursuant to Sexual Offender Treatment Programs, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 271 (2012). 
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about this population has been reflected in judicial decisions, at the trial, intermediate appellate 
and Supreme Court levels.289 The emerging laws and legislation have been more often than not 
found to be counter-productive and engendering a more dangerous set of conditions.290 As the 
authors have reiterated in prior articles,291 the   term   “sexually   violent   predator”   is   itself   “an  
emotionally  charged  one  that  conjures  up  many  misleading  or  inaccurate  images.”292 
Categorizing  this  population  as  the  “most  despised”  has  no  doubt  had  a  direct effect on 
the quality and availability of counsel for these individuals. Regardless of an  attorney’s  principled  
intentions, the emotional response generated from these types of crimes can have a detrimental 
effect on the quality of representation. Once again, the emphasis on ability of counsel cannot be 
undermined when we are considering an absolute right to counsel. 
C. The Need for a More Rigorous Advocacy Standard 
In short, the simple assignment of counsel will not provide adequate representation by 
any metric.293 Judge   David   Bazelon’s   characterization   of   many   of   the   lawyers   who   appeared  
before  him  as  “walking  violations  of  the  Sixth  Amendment,”294 referred to in the Introduction to 
this Article, still unfortunately resonates after four decades. The special confounding issues 
presented in these cases—the pretextuality of the entire SVPA process,295 the fact that most 
lawyers are not familiar with the psychometric tests that are at the heart of these proceedings, the 
failure of courts to extend the Ake v. Oklahoma ruling to such cases, and the level of hatred 
directed at this cohort of individuals as well as to their lawyers—demand a standard more 
rigorous than the pallid one presented in Strickland.296 
                                                                
289  For one striking example, see Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 60 (discussing a trial judge in one sex 
offender  case  who  said,  about  persons  who  molest  children,  “It   is  my  feeling  that  we  should  probably  dye  them  green”  
(citing Leonore H. Tavill, Scarlet Letter  Punishment:  Yesterday’s  Outlawed  Penalty  Is  Today’s  Probation  Condition, 36 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 644 n.193 (1988))). 
290  Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56, at 5. 
291  Id. at 2; Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 59, at 186. 
292  Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56, at 2 (discussing Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment 
Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 443 (2008)). 
293  On  the  additional  problems  raised  by  the  “status  quo  bias”  of  the  criminal  justice  system,  see Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal 
Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 315 (2012). 
294  Bazelon, supra note 18, at 2. 
295  See generally Perlin, supra note 31. 
296  A state court system, under the aegis of the Administrative Office of Courts, could certainly promulgate 
practice standards demanding an enhanced level of competency for attorneys representing defendants in such cases. We 
wish to thank our colleague Professor Rick Marsico for this helpful suggestion. 
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III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE297 
 One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past 
two decades  has  been   the  creation  of   therapeutic   jurisprudence  (“TJ”) . . . [TJ] 
assess[es] the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a 
therapeutic agent, the law . . . can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences. The ultimate aim of [TJ] is to determine whether legal rules, 
procedures, and the role of lawyers can or should be reshaped to enhance their 
therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. David 
Wexler identifies how the inherent tension in this inquiry must be resolved: 
“[T]he   law’s   use   of   mental   health   information   to   improve   therapeutic  
functioning  [cannot]  impinge  upon  justice  concerns.” As one of the authors of 
this article (MLP) has written elsewhere, “[a]n   inquiry   into   therapeutic  
outcomes  does  not  mean  that  “therapeutic  concerns  ‘trump’  civil  rights  and  civil  
liberties.”298 
 Therapeutic  jurisprudence  “asks  us  to  look  at  law  as  it  actually  impacts  
people’s   lives”   and   focuses   on   the   law’s   influence   on   emotional life and 
psychological well-being.   It   suggests   that   “law   should   value   psychological  
health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law[,] should attempt 
to bring  about  healing  and  wellness.”299 
. . . . 
. . . In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and 
promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been   described   as   “a   sea-
change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more 
distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasizes 
psychological   wellness   over   adversarial   triumphalism.” Accordingly, 
therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.300 
                                                                
297  The quotations in this section have been excerpted from Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You  
That  Hide  Behind  Walls”:  The  Relationship  between  the  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  Persons  with  Disabilities  and  the  
Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in TORTURE IN HEALTHCARE 
SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE’S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT 195 (2013), 
http://antitorture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PDF_Torture_in_Healthcare_Publication.pdf, and generally adapted 
from Michael L. Perlin, “Striking   for   the   Guardians   and   Protectors   of   the  Mind”:   The   Convention   on   the   Rights   of  
Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159 (2013). 
298  Perlin & Schriver, supra note 297, at 213-14 (citations omitted); see Perlin, supra note 297, at 1183-84. 
299  Perlin & Schriver, supra note 297, at 214 (citations omitted); see Perlin, supra note 297, at 1185. 
300  Perlin & Schriver, supra note 297, at 214-15 (citations omitted); see Perlin, supra note 297, at 1186. 
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 One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a 
commitment to dignity. Professor  Amy  Ronner  describes  the  “three  Vs”:  voice,  
validation[,] and voluntariness, arguing301: 
 What  “the  three  Vs”  commend  is  pretty  basic:  litigants  must  have  
a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that 
litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken 
seriously  the   litigant’s  story,  the  litigant   feels  a  sense  of  validation.  When  
litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and 
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation 
create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the 
part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that 
engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects 
their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in 
the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are 
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.302 
The question to be posed here is this: to what extent can therapeutic jurisprudence better 
inform legal practices to ensure that adequate counsel is provided to persons at SVP hearings in 
such a way that these principles written about by Professor Ronner—the principles of 
voluntariness, voice, and validation—can be honored? 
Although there has been important scholarly inquiry into the question of the relationship 
between TJ and the sex offender process in general,303 limited attention has been paid to the 
question before us here.304 What the substantive SVPA case law tells us, though, underscores the 
positive and essential relationship between adequate counsel and TJ in this context. Those very 
                                                                
301  Perlin & Schriver, supra note 297, at 215 (citations omitted); see Perlin, supra note 297, at 1186. 
302  Id. (quoting Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002)). 
303  We discuss some of this literature in Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 56. See, e.g., John Q. La Fond, Can 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 
ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 377 (1999); Katie Granlund, Does Societal Input Lead to Successful Sex Offender Legislation?, 29 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2005); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 506 (1998). 
304  But see Dale Dewhurst, Understanding   the   Legal   Client’s   Best   Interests: Lessons from Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Comprehensive Justice, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 963, 998-1003 (2013).  
 For  a  discussion  of  therapeutic  jurisprudence  and  lawyers’  roles  in  general,  see  Cucolo  &  Perlin,  supra note 56; 
Michael  L.  Perlin,  “And  My  Best  Friend,  My  Doctor/Won’t  Even  Say  What  It  Is  I’ve  Got”:  The  Role  and  Significance  of  
Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 750 (2005).  
 See also Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context: A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Solution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 120, 122 (1995) (discussing 
mediational lawyering in the civil commitment context); Jan C. Costello, “Why  Would  I  Need  a  Lawyer?”  Legal  Counsel  
and Advocacy for People with Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, & MENTAL DISORDER 15 (Bruce D. Sales 
& Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996); Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Competency Evaluation 
Requests:  The  Defense  Attorney’s  Dilemma, 18 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 95-96 (1995). 
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variables that make SVPA litigation different—the need for lawyers to be able to understand, 
contextualize and effectively cross-examine experts on specific actuarial tests; the need for 
lawyers  to  recognize  when  an  expert  witness  is  needed  to  rebut  the  state’s position, and the need 
for lawyers to understand the potential extent of jury bias (making the ideal of a fair trial even 
more difficult to accomplish)—all demand a TJ approach to representation and to litigation. 
Certainly, even a cursory examination of SVPA cases litigated on the right-to-counsel issue305 
demonstrate beyond any doubt  that  the  “voice”  required  in  Professor  Ronner’s  formulation  of  TJ  
is missing, and that we have no basis on which to make a reasoned conclusion as to whether 
“validity”  is  present. This is all the more important since the notion of “voluntariness”  is  certainly  
absent.306 
Looking at this question recently, Professor Dale Dewhurst concluded that, from a TJ 
perspective, lawyers must be able to engage with other behavioral experts in SVPA cases so as to 
provide adequate representation for their clients and—optimally—to share with the court 
treatment models that reject the current punitive measures that do not reduce recidivism.307 If 
counsel were familiar with such approaches as the Risk-Needs-Responsibility Model or the Good 
Lives model308—embodying  approaches  that  go  “beyond  the  legalistic  skills  of  the  lawyers”309—
she  would  best  embody  the  TJ  value  of  “zealous  counseling”  urged  by  Robert  Ward.310 
In short, TJ is completely absent from these proceedings. We believe that adoption of our 
effectiveness-of-counsel remedy might be the most important way of remediating this absence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When we presented a version of this Article at a faculty workshop, friends and 
colleagues, including those whose careers have been devoted to representing marginalized 
populations, told us that they found some of what we reported on “almost  unbelievable.”  We  were  
not surprised. What we have reported on here exists under the radar for almost all attorneys—
even progressive attorneys—who do not focus on these cases. So it is no surprise that these issues 
have remained unconsidered by courts and by scholars alike. 
What we have reported on is woeful. Again, perhaps more woeful is the fact that this 
entire issue is ignored in the public debate. We believe, however, that if the right to counsel were 
                                                                
305  See supra Part I.  
306  See Ronner, supra note 302. 
307  Dewhurst, supra note 304, at 1000 (citing DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN 
CORRECTIONS: REDUCING THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS & DELINQUENTS 333-34 (2006)). See, e.g., Grant 
Duwe, To What Extent Does Civil Commitment Reduce Sexual Recidivism? Estimating the Selective Incapacitation Effects 
in Minnesota, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 193 (2014) (discussing a Minnesota state study that concluded that just nine percent of 
civilly-committed sex offenders would have been reconvicted of a new sex offense within four years had they been 
released to the community).  
308  See Dewhurst, supra note 304, at 1000-02 (citing, inter alia, TONY WARD & SHADD MARUNA, 
REHABILITATION: BEYOND THE RISK PARADIGM 46 (2007), and Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex 
Offenders: A Psycho-Legal Approach to Protection, 16 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 351, 360 (2004)). 
309  Dewhurst, supra note 304, at 1002. 
310  Id. at 971 (quoting Robert Ward, Criminal Defense Practice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Zealous 
Advocacy through Zealous Counseling: Perspectives, Plans and Policy, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 206 (David B. Wexler ed., 2008)). 
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to be made mandatory in all SVP cases, and if the standard of adequacy of counsel in such cases 
was  to  be  enhanced  (as  the  Montana  Supreme  Court  did   in  “regular”  civil  commitment cases in 
K.G.F.),311 then counsel would be more likely to be effective, and that the underlying proceedings 
would have at least a patina of fairness. 
Recall what Dylan critic Michael Gray had to say about Jokerman, the song from which 
the first part  of  the  title  of  this  article  is  derived:  “‘[E]vil’  is  not  ‘out  there,’  ‘among  the  others,’  
but  is  inside  us  all.”312 By depicting sex offenders as “monsters,”313 we ignore this, which allows 
us to ignore the realities of the SVPA process and the need for effective counsel. It is time to stop 
ignoring these realities. 
 
                                                                
311  See In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 497-498; see also text accompanying notes 22-25, supra. 
312  GRAY, supra note 61, at 364. 
313  See, e.g., Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice: The 
Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR 
CULTURE 109, 120 (2003). 
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